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Abstract 
Cryptography plays an important role in protecting the data security of wireless sensor 
networks (WSNs). However, it is greatly constrained by the limited energy supply of a 
sensor node. In this thesis, we focus on the energy efficiency of secure communication in 
wireless sensor networks (WSNs). Our research considers both the cryptographic 
algorithms and the cryptographic schemes when link layer security is applied to a WSN. 
By implementing symmetric key ciphers in both software and hardware, we evaluate the 
computational energy cost considering both the algorithm characteristics and channel 
quality. We further explore different factors that affect the communication energy cost of 
link layer cryptographic schemes, such as the payload size, the mode of operation, the 
initialization vector distribution, and the communication channel quality. We evaluate the 
energy efficiency of different cryptographic schemes for data transmission by developing 
an analysis model that is constructed considering various factors affecting both the 
computational cost and communication cost. Its appropriateness is further verified and 
supported by simulation results. We also investigate the energy cost of session key 
establishment in a WSN. In conclusion, we recommend using a lightweight block cipher, 
byte-wise substitution permutation network (BSPN), along with the ciphertext feedback 
scheme for wireless sensor networks to achieve security and better energy efficiency. To 
enhance the data security further in a WSN, we also suggest using a key distribution 
protocol based on symmetric key cryptography, which can lead to a robust system with 
acceptable additional energy consumption. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) provide a link between the real world 
application and the widely used Internet, by se nsing, monitoring, and managing our 
physical world. Although this type of network was initially designed for military usage, it 
has been become an important part of our daily life. For example, in the field of 
environmental monitoring and protection, sensor networks can be used to sense potential 
disasters such as earthquake and forest fire, and monitor the habit of wildlife for 
ecosystem research and protection. In the field of human healthcare, it can be used to 
detect abnormal health status of patients. In the field of industry automation, it can be 
used to monitor areas that are not accessible human beings such as some industrial 
processes or disaster zones. It is worth noticing that no applications can achieve the best 
effect unless the security of transferred information can be well protected. However, the 
limited energy supply of a sensor node makes it impractical to use traditional security 
protocols in a WSN. Hence, security in WSNs becomes a challenging issue and its 
protocols need to be specifically designed [I]. 
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In this chapter, we first review the state-of-the-art work in WSNs and introduce the 
most important component in achieving security: cryptography. After that, we show the 
motivation of our research and present the organization of this thesis. 
1.1 Wireless Sensor Networks 
A sensor node is a small sized device, capable of sensing parameters of its 
environments, such as sound, light, temperature, and so on. A large amount of these 
sensors can work cooperatively to form a network, referred to as a wireless sensor 
network, by transmitting data through wireless channels. Recent developments in sensing, 
wireless communications, and networking technologies make it possible to sense a broad 
range of information, from small amounts of information such as moisture, light and 
smoke to larger sized information such as voice and image. In this section, we review 
different WSNs from the application context perspective. 
ln WSNs, a transceiver is an important component, in charge of sending and receiving 
data. The transceiver of most sensor nodes operates on narrowband radios (at frequencies 
such as 433MHz and 868MHz) so that the sensor node can have a longer life span by 
satisfying the balance between low data rate and small energy consumption [2]. Some 
high-end sensor nodes may use wideband radios (at 2.4GHz), such as Bluetooth or IEEE 
802.15.4 (MAC and physical layer of Zigbee), to achieve high throughput for certain 
application environments. With the development of microelectronic technologies, new 
generation of wireless sensors tend to use Wi-Fi technology due to the availability of low 
power integrated circuits. Nevertheless, the main trend of wireless sensor network 
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development still follows the original path and typical sensor products still operate on 
narrowband radios. 
1.1.1 Classical WSN with Low Throughput 
We use the term classical WSNto refer to a WSN using typical sensor products, which 
can sense and transmit small amounts of data at each time. For example, in environmental 
monitoring, certain types of physical and chemical parameters for the environment are 
periodically sensed and transmitted out to the base station. Habitat monitoring on Great 
Duck Island (GDI) is a typical project for this type of sensor network application [3]. The 
goal is to study the relationship between the environment and duck's habitat based on the 
sensing data. Hence, their normal lives will not be disturbed. In this project, a popular 
type of sensor device called Mica is utilized and the architecture of the monitoring system 
is shown in Fig. 1.1. In this figure, a sensor node functions as a transmit-only device and 
transmits small-sized packets (with payload sizes less than 30 bytes). Each node has a 
limited energy capability since they are only equipped with two AA batteries. In each 
region of the monitored area, there is a node called a gateway, which has more energy 
supply and stronger processing capability. The gateway node receives messages from 
sensor nodes within its control area, performs aggregation algorithms on the collected 
data and sends aggregation results to the base station. Finally, through the Internet, the 
researchers can retrieve the data for further analysis. 
Similar archHectures can also be used in the monitoring of seismic parameters, forest 
fire indicators, contaminant transport, etc .. Usually, the sensor node is low cost and has 
low throughput for this type of WSN. The small-sized packet occupies the bandwidth 
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discontinuously and does not need to be transmitted with a high speed. However, energy 
limitation is a critical problem in the sensor node due to the non-rechargeable battery 
inside. Thus lightweight protocols are needed to extend the sensor node's life span as 
long as possible. 
Data service 
Fig. 1.1. System architecture for habitat monitoring on GDI. 
1.1.2 WMSN with High Throughput 
The development of the electronic technology has greatly decreased the cost of CMOS 
cameras and microphones and has led to the emergence of wireless multimedia sensor 
networks (WMSN) [4]. In this kind of network, sensor nodes are equipped with certain 
modules to capture video or audio information to be transmitted through a wireless link. 
The abundant information contained in video and audio streams makes the WMSN a 
suitable candidate for such application. Therefore, WMSN has become very attractive 
since it can satisfy many application requirements and improve the performance of 
current services such as surveillance and traffic control. The architecture of typical 
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architectures of WMSN is illustrated in Fig. 1.2. There are rna ny different types of 
architecture in WMSN [5], such as (a) single-tier flat architecture with homogeneous 
sensors, distributed processing, and centralized storage; (b) single-tier clustered 
architecture with heterogeneous sensors, centralized processing, and centralized storage; 
and (c) multi-tier architecture with heterogeneous sensors, distributed processing, and 
distributed storage. 
Compared to classical WSNs, a WMSN includes sensor devices with relatively higher 
cost and possesses higher throughput since a large amount of data needs to be transmitted 
in real time. Although sensor nodes may be rechargeable, energy is still a critical issue 
since a large volume of data needs to be transmitted frequently. Efficient data 
compression algorithms and effective communication protocols are important factors 
affecting the performance of this kind of network. 
Wireless gateway 
Data Storage Basestation 
Fig. 1.2 Architecture of WMSN. 
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1.1.3 WBSN with Hybrid Needs 
Wireless body sensor networks (WBSNs) (also called medical sensor networks) are 
attracting much attention nowadays due to their significant contribution to healthcare and 
to people's daily lives. WBSNs enable the continuous monjtoring of people's health 
status via various types of sensors for medical sensing. Among those sensors, a special 
one called cluster head is used to gather data from all the other medical sensors on the 
body and send them out through wireless networks periodically. If there are abnormal 
symptoms, an emergency alert will be sent to a health-monitoring centre, or to the 
doctor's clinic. There are two typical scenarios in WBSN: (I) Ion g term healthcare 
monitoring during a person 's daily life (2) real-time monitoring in hospitals. The first 
scenario is appropriate for people who are susceptible to illness due to aging or chronic 
diseases, while the second scenario is applicable to patients who are already ill and are 
hospitalized for a period. 
~~.., aquiring and sending 
.rl' medical information 
/ B L! . ..-- - --. 
~·m·-
,,/ cu 
• ... : .. ' 
wireless medical sensor 
I 
{\ wireless transmission backbone 
(n) 
/ ~ ~ 
hospital or med~~ centor 
(b) 
Fig. 1.3. Scenario of long-tet:m healthcare monitoring )6). 
The long-term monitoring scenario is shown in Fig. 1.3, including (a) home mode and 
(b) nomadic mode [6]. The home mode is active when the person to be monitored is at 
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home, where the computer functions as a base station, i.e., gathering various types of data 
from the person and the surrounding environment through wireless communications and 
finally sent out through the Internet. The nomadic mode is activated when the person is 
outside the home. Since no computer functions as a base station, a mobile phone or 
personal digital assistant (PDA) will be used to collect the data and send it out through 
wireless networks. 
~ 0 EhJ ~ 0 ~ A medical statl' ~J ~ patient 
------· Do .. _ Qo ~0 D 6. cluster head 
0 ° 
0 0 ~ gateway 
0 h 0 0 0 
====o==o= w o A ~ database 
~(I]~~~ 
Fig. 1.4. Scenario of monitoring in hospitals 171. 
The scenario of monitoring in hospitals is illustrated in Fig. 1.4, where wireless nodes 
installed in hospitals will gather medical information from patients and send to the cluster 
head [7]. The utilization of medical sensors frees patients in the hospital from being 
constrained in bed all day and allows them moving as they want. Large amounts of sensor 
nodes with special functions are deployed densely all over the hospital, which collect and 
analyze data from the patients in their sensing range. If the data is beyond the normal 
range, the data will be immediately sent to the monitoring center along with the accurate 
location of the patient, and in certain urgent cases, emergency alarming will be triggered 
as well. Otherwise, the data will be stored as a common record and will be sent to the 
monitoring centre when the network is available. 
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Compared with other applications in wireless sensor networks, a medical application 
is especially challenging due to its application environment, which combines 
characteristics of classical WSN and WMSN. It is essential to give more consideration on 
the data diversity and information security. Various data with different packet lengths and 
formats are involved and there are multiple types of sensors used in the network. These 
sensors monitor parameters of various objects, including patient parameters such as heart 
rate, oximetry, blood pressure, environmental parameters such as temperature and 
moisture, or even a real-time image of a patient using a camera. 
1.2 Cryptography 
Cryptography is the science of information security, which studies the technique of 
protecting information from being known and/or altered by unauthorized people [8]. The 
data is transformed with a key (additional secret information shared between two 
communicating parties) so that it can only be accessed by a party with authorization. The 
process of converting the original data to a secret message is called encryption; 
correspondingly, the inverse process is called decryption. The security of a cryptography 
algorithm is assessed based on the assumption that the structure of the algorithm is 
known while the key is not known. Cryptography can be mainly categorized into two 
types: symmetric key cryptography and asymmetric key cryptography (also called public 
key cryptography). 
In this section, we introduce the basic knowledge of cryptography and the objectives 
to be achieved by using cryptography. 
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1.2.1 Different Types of Cryptography 
1) Symmetric Key Cryptography 
Symmetric key cryptography is developed from classical ciphers in ancient times, 
which typically process data through a relatively simple way, such as substituting an 
alphabet character with another one or transposing a character's position. Symmetric key 
cryptography focuses on the structure of iteratively applied simple cryptographic 
operations using the same key for encryption and decryption. A simplified model for 
symmetric key cryptography is illustrated in Fig. 1.5, where the input data to be 
encrypted is called plaintext, and the corresponding encryption result is called ciphertext. 
Only the authorized receiver can understand the message by decryption using the key 
shared with the sender so that the message is protected from being known by others. 
Plaintext input Encryption 
Secrete key shared by 
sender and receiver 
Decryption Ciphertext output 
Fig. 1.5. Simplified model for symmetric key cryptography. 
Symmetric key cryptography includes two types of ciphers: stream ciphers and block 
ciphers, which are illustrated in Fig. 1.6 and explained as follows: 
• Block cipher 
As illustrated in Fig. 1.6 (a), a block cipher operates on a block of data (typically 64 
bits or 128 bits) by iterating rounds of simple cryptographic operations. In this figure, b 
and k represents the key size and block size, respectively. An S-box is typically an 
important component in a block cipher, and functions as a nonlinear transformation for 
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the data block thereby introducing a complex mathematical relationship between 
plaintext and ciphertext. Another important component in a block cipher is linear 
transformation, such as transposition of data bits. The linear transformation aims to bring 
about diffusion, which means if there is one bit changed in the plaintext, there will be a 
random change for the ciphertext. Each round of the cipher operation involves a different 
sub-key (or round key), which is generated according to the algorithm called key 
scheduling. 
The block cipher can be further divided into two types from the structural perspective: 
Feistel network and substitution permutation network (SPN) [8]. The Feistel structure 
only operates on a half block of data within one round. The Data Encryption Standard 
(DES) [9] is an example block cipher using this type of structure. An SPN processes the 
whole block of data in each round. An example SPN cipher is the Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES) [I 0]. 
key 
k 
plaintext 
b 
Encryption 
b 
ciphertext 
(a) block cipher 
key 
k 
plaintext 
IV 
i 
Key stream 
generator 
key stream 
------.+~+--1-+ ciphertext 
(b) stream cipher 
Fig. 1.6. Symmetric key ciphers: block cipher vs. stream cipher. 
• Stream cipher 
As illustrated in Fig. 1.6 (b), a stream cipher typically operates on one bit of data at a 
time by XORing the generated keystream with plaintext. The keystream is a stream of 
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unpredictable pseudorandom bits. The critical problem in stream ciphers is losing 
synchronization between the transmitter and receiver, which is caused by lost data. As a 
result, the following data will be corrupted. To solve this problem, extra information 
needs to be transmitted from time to time to ensure the keystream is synchronized so that 
the data at the receiver side can be properly restored. The stream cipher can be divided 
into two types according to its keystream characteristic: synchronous and self-
synchronizing. Synchronous stream ciphers generate keystream independent from the 
plaintext and ciphertext, and rely on synchronization of keystream at the transmitter and 
receiver. In contrast, self-synchronizing stream ciphers (such as MOSQUITO [ 11]) use 
previous ciphertext bits to generate the keystream, and the receiver can be resynchronized 
automatically. Although currently most self-synchronizing stream ciphers are found to 
have security flaws, it is possible to use the mode of operation, a scheme operating on a 
block cipher, to configure block ciphers as a stream cipher using cipher feedback to 
ensure self-synchronization characteristics, such as SCFB mode [ 12). 
Project eSTREAM, organized by EU ECRYPT, evaluated new stream ciphers [13]. 
The final selected eSTREAM portfolio algorithms include: (1) HC-128, Rabbit, 
Salsa20/12, and SOSEMANUK, which are designed for software purpose (Profile 1), (2) 
F-FCSR-H v2, Grain vl, Mickey v2 and Trivium, which are designed for hardware 
purpose (Profile 2). 
2) Asymmetric Key Cryptography 
Asymmetric key cryptography depends on the difficulty of a mathematical problem, 
and two different keys are involved for encryption and decryption, respectively. This pair 
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of keys includes one public key (known publicly) and one private key (kept secretly), 
which are different and mathematically related. Asymmetric key cryptography can 
provide both the data confidentiality and the identity authentication as illustrated in Fig. 
1.7. 
Public key 
Plaintext input 
Private key 
Plaintext input 
Transmitted 
ciphertext 
(a) Encryption 
Transmitted 
ciphertext 
(b) Authentication 
Private key 
Ciphertext output 
Public key 
Ciphertext output 
Fig. 1.7. Simplified model for asymmetric key cryptography. 
There are two well-applied a symmetric key ciphers: RSA [14] and elliptic curve 
cryptography (ECC) [ 15]. RSA is an early public key cipher, which bases its security on 
the difficulty of factoring a large composite number into prime numbers. RSA is widely 
used in security protocols for authentication. However, it introduces large complexity for 
implementation. ECC is based on the algebraic structure of elliptic curves over finite 
fields where it is assumed that it is difficult to find the discrete logarithm of a random 
elliptic curve element according to a publicly known base point. Compared to RSA, the 
implementation complexity of ECC is much lower and, hence, it is recommended for use 
in lightweight security protocols. 
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1.2.2 Cryptography Objectives 
By applying cryptography, many security features can be achieved, as summarized 
below: 
• Access control: Access control is a security requirement for the physical layer. 
Only the authorized users can access to the network or host system, and they must 
obey their orgaruzation's policy. 
• Confidentiality: Confidentiality guarantees that information can only be read by 
authorized users, that is, the message cannot be revealed by simple eavesdropping 
by unauthorized users. 
• Authentication: Authentication is a mechanism used to ensure the identity of both 
communicating parties, so that the message is communicated between parties with 
valid identity. Authentication is used to prevent attackers from forging data and 
masquerading as legitimate users. 
• Integrity: Integrity means that data should be transmitted without being changed. 
The information should be protected in the whole network, including both users' 
private data and control information. 
• Freshness: Freshness ensures prevention of the message replay attack. That is, a 
data packet transmitted earlier cannot be transmitted again, since denial of service 
(DoS) may happen if the attacker stores old packets and keeps resending them. 
Usually, nonces and timestamps are used in the security scheme. 
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• Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation means that the user cannot deny the fact that it 
had used the network. That is to say, the truth of an already happened activity in 
the network should be able to be proved. 
1.3 Security in WSNs 
In this section, we will focus on the security mechanisms in wireless systems, in 
particular, the importance and challenges of achieving security in WSNs. 
1.3.1 Security in General Wireless Systems 
We focus on introducing several aspects of security in general wireless networks: (I) 
attacks from different perspectives and their consequences; (2) current security 
approaches functioning in different ways to protect the whole network's security; (3) 
cryptography and its two important components, cryptographic algorithm and 
cryptographic scheme. 
1) Attacks: Data vs. Channel 
The objective of applying security mechanisms is to prevent the network from being 
successfully attacked. Attacks can be classified from different perspectives: from the data 
transmission aspect, it can be classified as passive attack and active attack; while from 
the communication channel aspect, it can be divided into overusing and jamming attacks. 
Although the detailed ways of attacks may vary greatly, attack consequences can be 
classified into a few categories. The detailed consequences of attacks are discussed as 
following: 
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• Eavesdropping 
Eavesdropping is a common way to attack and is a passive attack. Attackers overhear 
the information being transmitted. It is especially easy for such attacks in wireless 
networks due to the use of open medium. As a result, the privacy may not be protected, 
although attackers may not change the content. 
• Data Alteration 
Altering the communication data is generally regarded as an active attack. Attackers 
not only steal the message from the sender, but also change the content before sending it 
out. The altered message will bring in great danger because the receiver and transmitter 
will make wrong decisions based on the message they receive. 
• Radio Channel Overuse 
Some users may overuse the radio spectrum, which is supposed to be shared by all 
users. This will not happen in cellular phone systems because protocols constrain the 
subscriber's use. However, for other networks where spectrum is shared, like Wi-Fi, such 
issues may exist. 
• Channel Jamming 
Jamming can happen at multiple protocol layers, including the physical layer, link 
layer, and higher layers. At the physical layer, noise is the general form, which has 
serious impact on the normal communication activity. At the link layer, jamming occurs 
as the attacker keeps sending messages when other users are going to transmit and/or 
receive information. The jammed messages ensure other users cannot access the medium 
and cannot communicate with each other. Such an attack is also known as the denial of 
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service (DoS) attack. In WSNs, the jammed packet can even deplete the energy supply of 
a sensor node and eventually cause it not to work anymore. 
2) Approach: Protection vs. Detection 
Generally, security mechanisms in wireless networks can be divided into two 
categories: protection based and detection based. Protection based technologies can be 
viewed as the first defense line of the security system, in which cryptography is used to 
prevent malicious outside attackers from using both passive attacks and active attacks. At 
the same time, detection based technologies form the second line of defense of security 
system. They are used to detect the possible intrusion inside the network in order to 
prevent the situation that the cryptographic system has been compromised. For example, 
in a WSN, a sensor node may be obtained and modified by attacker after deployment. It 
is not easy to notice the attack by using cryptography; however, it may be easy to detect 
by observing the abnormal behavior of the sensor node. 
• Protection Based 
In order to achieve proper data safety, a cryptographic algorithm is used to protect data 
from being revealed. Typically, a cipher is used to execute operations of encryption and 
decryption, which enables the secure communication over an insecure channel. The data 
transmitted securely in a network is ensured by cryptographic schemes, which can be 
viewed as a combined consideration of selecting ciphers and how to use them to achieve 
security goals. The security of cryptography relies on the condition that the secret key is 
kept safe by the users on each side of the communication and not known by others. A 
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 17 
typical method of breaking such security is to collect messages between two 
communicating parties and analyze them to find the weakness. 
• Detection Based 
There is no cryptography involved in the detection-based approaches. Detection based 
approaches mainly focus on the signs of being attacked by monitoring the network traffic. 
For example, misuse detection depends on the experience accumulated. The known 
attacker activities are collected to build the database for checking for future misuse 
behavior. Anomaly detection focuses on detecting abnormality of the network activity, 
which depends on the definition of what kind of activity should be regarded as normal or 
abnormal. 
3) Cryptography: Algorithm vs. Scheme 
Cryptography includes two important components: the cryptographic algorithm and 
the cryptographic scheme, whose research focus is illustrated in Fig. 1.8. The 
cryptographic algorithm directly operates on data, which needs to be protected. In 
contrast, the cryptographic scheme concentrates on how to implement the cryptographic 
algorithm to ensure the security in the whole system. The cryptographic algorithm can be 
further divided into two categories: symmetric key algorithms and asymmetric key 
~ 
algorithms. As discussed previously, symmetric key algorithms can be further 
categorized into two types: block ciphers and stream ciphers. 
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Fig. 1.8. Cryptography category. 
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Block cipher 
Stream cipher 
Usually, cryptographers design a cipher and conduct cryptanalysis to ensure that the 
cipher will not be broken using a practical amount of resources in a practical amount of 
time. Each type of the cipher has different characteristics, and the application 
environment determines which one is chosen for use. In Table 1.1, we list the ciphers 
selected for different application environments due to their corresponding network 
characteristics. 
Table 1.1. Cipher used in different application environment. 
Network Cipher used Cipher type 
ZigBee (IEEE 802.15.4) AES Block cipher 
Bluetooth (IEEE 802.15.1) EO Stream cipher 
WLAN (IEEE 802.11) RC4 I AES Stream I block cipher 
GSM AS/ I and A512 Stream cipher 
3G networks KASUMI Block cipher 
UWB (IEEE 802.15.3a) Compact ciphers Stream cipher and block cipher 
Cryptographic schemes may cover multiple aspects, such as secure data transmission 
and key distribution through an insecure communication channel. For secure data 
transmission, a scheme needs to consider which cipher to use and how to use it in an 
efficient way. For the key establishment, a scheme needs to consider how to make two 
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communicating parties agree on a key securely without revealing the key to others. 
Identity authentication is an important aspect and usually depends on a trusted third party. 
During communication, a message authentication code (MAC) value [8] and digital 
signatures [8] are often used to ensure the authentication and integrity, meanwhile, 
nonces and timestamps are used to prevent message replaying attacks. A good 
cryptographic scheme needs to consider many factors as shown in Table 1.2. 
Table 1.2. Common considerations for cryptographic scheme. 
From the cryptographic algorithm aspect 
• The complexity of the cipher 
• The energy cost of the cipher 
• The restrictions of the cipher 
• The implementation environment 
(software or hardware) 
From the network requirement aspect 
• The security requirements 
• The life time span of the network 
• The network throughput requirement 
• The size of the data being operated upon 
• The feature of the data (real time 
processing or post time processing) 
It is worth noting that cryptography is not omnipotent and it has its own limitations. 
For example, a MAC can determine whether the received data is different from the 
transmitted data, however, it cannot discern the reason of the difference (a malicious 
attack or just a noisy channel). Cryptographic algorithms cannot make everything 
magically secure. For instance, they cannot prevent traffic analysis or refuse to receive 
the replayed packets. In addition, cryptography cannot solve the problem of packets being 
jammed and cannot get rid of a malicious insider such as a captured node. Nevertheless, 
cryptography is still an efficient and straightforward approach to protect the network 
communication from being attacked. 
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1.3.2 Challenge of Security in WSNs 
A WSN is a specific type of wireless network and its security system largely inherits 
the same characteristics as other wireless networks. Here we just reinforce the importance 
of securing a WSN and the challenges of a secure WSN. 
Information security in WSNs is important: 
• In classical WSNs, information security directly relates to the validity of the 
monitored data and the result of analysis. In cases of security and disaster 
monitoring applications, maliciously changed data may hide the possibility of a 
disaster or generate false alarms, which may mislead people into panic. 
• In WMSNs, the data may include private information of people, which should be 
kept confidential from any unauthorized personnel. 
• Information security is particularly important in WBSNs. First, malicious 
modification of the medical data will seriously affect medical analysis. As a more 
serious result, it may threaten the safety of a patient's life. Second, since the 
medical data may directly involve the privacy of the person monitored, the data 
should be guaranteed secure in transmission and storage. 
Information security in WSNs is challenging: 
• The data is transmitted in an open wireless media, which makes the security 
system more vulnerable. This is a typical nature of the wireless network, and the 
transmitted information can be easily eavesdropped. 
• Sensor nodes are often deployed in an area lacking supervision by people, which 
greatly increases the possibility of being attacked. 
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• Limited energy supply in sensor devices is a huge problem, which limits the 
security level that can be achieved in a WSN. The reason is that a sensor node 
cannot afford to use complicated cryptographic schemes due to their large energy 
cost, although those schemes may provide strong protection and be difficult to 
break. 
1.4 Motivation for Research 
As discussed in the previous section, there are many challenges to achieve security 
goals in WSNs. Some physical constraints may not be avoidable due to the nature of 
WSN itself, such as openness of the wireless media, limited power supply, and the non-
protected sensor device during com munication. Nevertheless, the problem of limited 
energy can be mitigated by using appropriate methods. 
We maintain that both cryptographic algorithms and cryptographic schemes affect the 
energy efficiency in a secure WSN. Although there are energy-oriented schemes 
proposed for WSNs, no effort has been made to investigate the energy efficiency of a 
sensor node in a noisy environment, and jointly considering the cryptographic algorithm 
and the cryptographic scheme as a whole. Motivated by this observation, we explore the 
energy efficiency when cryptography is applied to WSNs. The objective of our research 
is to investigate the energy efficiency in secure WSNs by jointly considering the 
cryptographic algorithms and the cryptographic schemes. 
In considering cryptographic algorithms for WSNs, we investigate the implementation 
of the algorithms in both software and hardware environments. For software 
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implementation, we evaluate the computational energy cost of different symmetric key 
ciphers considering both the algorithm characteristics and channel quality. For hardware 
implementation, we focus on the energy efficient design, specifically, investigating the 
performance of hardware and software cooperation. 
In the study of cryptographic schemes in WSNs, we explore the effects of various 
factors on energy consumption for different schemes, including packet size, process used 
in the generation of the initialization vector, and channel quality. We present the 
integrated performance evaluation for different ciphers and schemes by developing an 
analysis model for a sensor node. The appropriateness of the model is supported by 
simulation results. We also investigate the energy consumption for the session key 
establishment in WSNs, considering different effects, such as cryptographic algorithms 
and key update frequencies. 
1.5 Thesis Organization 
The organization of thesis is as follows and illustrated in Fig. 1.9: 
In Chapter 2, we provide the background and literature review pertaining to our 
research work. 
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Fig. 1.9. Thesis organization. 
In Chapter 3, we present the method to evaluate the energy cost in a sensor node. We 
propose to use energy efficiency, i.e., the total amount of valid information transmitted 
per Joule, as the performance metric and present a method of energy calculation 
including both the computational cost and communication cost. After that, we focus on 
investigating a case including no security features, which provides a basis for further 
investigating the energy performance of a secure WSN. In this case, we specifically 
evaluate the energy cost of a sensor node and investigate different factors affecting the 
energy performance such as the payload size and the channel quality. 
In Chapter 4, we evaluate the energy cost for cryptographic algorithms considering 
their software application environment, which is provided for commonly used sensor 
nodes. We implement the ciphers (including both stream ciphers and block ciphers) in 
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assembly language and derive the computational energy cost model of the ciphers in 
terms of the number of CPU cycles required to perform encryption. Furthermore, we 
evaluate the energy performance of cryptographic algorithms when they are applied to a 
WSN in noisy channel conditions. 
In Chapter 5, we conduct the energy cost evaluation for cryptographic algorithms 
considering their hardware application environment, which is provided by reconfigurable 
sensor nodes. We propose using involutional block ciphers since the characteristic of 
involution operation enables performing encryption and decryption using the same piece 
of logic circuit. We choose two involutional block ciphers KHAZAD and BSPN for 
implementation. Our particular focus is on the analysis of the energy cost of different 
implementation methods. In addition, we investigate the energy cost considering software 
and hardware cooperation in reconfigurable sensor nodes. 
In Chapter 6, we focus on the energy cost analysis for different cryptographic schemes 
in a WSN, which directly affect the communication energy cost for a wireless sensor 
node. Specifically, we investigate different parameters, which affect the energy cost of 
link layer cryptographic schemes, such as the payload size, the distribution of 
initialization vector, and the channel quality. We propose an analysis model, which takes 
into account these parameters, to evaluate the performance of cryptographic 
communication schemes. We further conduct simulation experiments to verify and 
support the appropriateness of the proposed model. 
In Chapter 7, we investigate the energy cost for session key establishment in a WSN. 
We examine the energy cost of session key establishment using the model developed in 
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the previous chapter. We explore the effects of a key establishment to the overall energy 
supply in a sensor node, especially considering the key establishment frequency and the 
channel quality. 
In Chapter 8, we conclude the thesis and provide suggested future research directions. 
Chapter 2 
BACKGROUND 
This chapter presents the background for our research. We first review security 
protocols in various types of networks (from wired to wireless) to show a general concept 
of the security protocols: cryptographic schemes are designed to satisfy th e specific 
requirements of application environments. Then we focus on presenting the state-of-the-
art development in secure WSNs for different aspects, such as cryptographic algorithms 
and cryptographic schemes. 
2.1 Cryptography Applied to Various Networks 
In this section, we review how cryptography is applied to different types of networks, 
such as the Internet wired network, and wireless local area networks (WLANs), wireless 
personal area networks (WP ANs), and mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) as examples 
of wireless networks. 
2.1.1 Wired network: the Internet 
Network communication is a complicated process since it is impacted by many factors, 
such as speed, scalability, bandwidth, reliability and security. To satisfy these 
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requirements, a layered protocol is proposed to deal with the information independently 
based on functionality [ 16]. The Internet can be divided into five major layers, as shown 
in Fig. 2.1, which are physical layer, link layer, network layer, transport layer and 
application layer. When sending out a message, the transmitter attaches different headers 
to the original message from top to bottom according to different layers. While receiving 
a packet, these headers are stripped out at different layers from bottom to top, finally 
obtaining the original message. Protocols are applied to different layers to ensure the 
order and validity of the data among the communicating parties by well-defined packet 
formats and rules. 
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Fig. 2.1. Protocol layers in the Internet 116). 
In the Internet, various security protocols are applied to different protocol layers of the 
network: 
• Security at the Link layer 
Point-to-point protocol (PPP) (RFC 1661) [ 17] is a typical link layer protocol, 
establishing a direct connection between two communicating nodes. PPP can operate on 
multiple types of physical media, such as a telephone line, a SONET/SDH link, an X.25 
connection, or an ISDN circuit. There are many authentication protocols running over 
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PPP, such as password authentication protocol (PAP) (RFC1334) [18], challenge-
handshake authentication protocol (CHAP) (RFC 1994) [ 19], and extensible 
authentication protocol (EAP) (RFC2284) [20]. PAP is the simplest authentication 
protocol, which transmits the user name and password directly without encryption. It is 
vulnerable to attacks since anyone can get the password directly by monitoring and 
analyzing the packet. CHAP provides higher security level, using MD5 to generate a hash 
value based on the private information of the remote user and the challenge information 
from the authenticator. EAP provides a framework of authentication (for both PPP and 
IEEE 802) and it only defines the packet format to indicate how the packet should be 
encapsulated. 
• Security at the network layer 
The Internet protocol security (!Psec) is a typical security protocol operating on IP 
packets at the network layer [16]. IPsec provides authentication, confidentiality, and key 
management, and it defines two types of protocols: authentication header (AH) protocol 
and encapsulating security payload (ESP) protocol, providing authentication and 
encryption-authentication, respectively. There are two working modes for both AH 
protocol and ESP protocol: transport mode and tunnel mode. Transport mode is used in 
end-to-end communication providing protections for upper-layer protocols, which means 
it only operates on the payload of the IP packet. In contrast, ESP protocol focuses on 
protecting the entire IP packet between two security gateways by encapsulating the whole 
IP packet as a payload with a new packet header. IPsec provides an overall security 
service for IP packets and the details are determined by the utilization of AH protocol 
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and/or ESP protocol. The security services provided by IPsec include access control , 
connectionless integrity, data origin authentication, rejection of replayed packets (a form 
of partial sequence integrity), confidentiality (encryption), and limited traffic flow 
confidentiality. 
• Security at the transport layer 
In the Internet, transport layer security (TLS) (or secure socket layer (SSL)) is a 
security protocol operating at the transport layer [ 16]. It is a two-layer security protocol 
and provides protection for the TCP segment for end-to-end communication. 
Application Data 
After Fragmentation 
Compression 
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Append SSL record header []~~~88j 
Fig. 2.2. Operation of SSL record protocol JI6J. 
The basic layer in TLS/SSL is the record protocol, which provides basic security 
services such as data confidentiality and integrity to its upper layer. TLS/SSL provides 
confidentiality by using symmetric key cipher and provides message integrity by using 
message authentication code (MAC) (8]. The specific operation process of the record 
protocol is shown in Fig. 2.2. 
Within the layer of the record protocol, there are three specific protocols: the 
handshake protocol, the change cipher spec protocol, and the alert protocol. The 
handshake protocol is used to decide the algorithm and encryption key for both 
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communicating parties and it should be used before the start of data transmission. The 
change cipher spec protocol is a single byte message, which is used to update the cipher 
being used in the connection. The alert protocol functions as transmitting alerts such as 
indicating the status of the connection (warning or fatal) and the detailed alert (such as 
unexpected message received, incorrect MAC received, and so on). 
• Security at the application layer 
At the application layer, there are many security protocols providing data 
confidentiality, integrity and identity authentication, such as secure shell (SSH) [21 ], 
pretty good privacy (PGP) [22], secure electronic transaction (SET) [23] and Kerberos 
protocols [24]. These protocols focus on specific applications: PGP focuses on protecting 
the privacy of Emails, SET focuses on securing credit card transactions, and Kerberos 
focuses on key distribution and identity authentication. Security protocols at the 
application layer can be very flexible and designed according to the specific needs. 
2.1.2 Cryptography Applied to Wireless Network 
1) Cryptography Applied to WLAN 
A wireless local area network (WLAN) is a popular wireless network being used in 
small range area such as schools and office buildings. Laptops and PDAs are typical 
devices in WLANs, using an access point (AP) to connect to a wide area network 
(usually the Internet). WLANs may also be called "802.11 ", or " Wi-Fi" . There are two 
working modes in a WLAN: infrastructure mode and ad hoc mode, which are illustrated 
in Fig. 2.3, with the difference of whether an AP exists in the network [16]. 
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In WLANs, the development of security protocols has involved fixing security flaws 
for higher security requirements. These involved Wi-Fi security standards include wired 
equivalent privacy (WEP) [25] and Wi-Fi protected access (WPA and WPA2) [26]. 
WP A is built upon WEP, adding more security mechanisms (such as key management, 
encryption and authentication) to make it more secure. WP A2 is designed to replace 
WPA by introducing more security mechanisms. For data confidentiality, both WEP and 
WPA use the stream cipher RC4, while WPA2 select AES for better security; for the data 
integrity, WEP uses CRC, while WPA and WPA2 use Michael and counter with CBC-
MAC (CCM) mode on AES, respectively, to generate a message integrity code (MIC). 
WEP uses the same key for all communication and the key never expires; WP A fixes this 
weakness by providing a rekeying mechanism called temporal key integrity protocol 
(TKIP) and using multiple keys; WPA2 also uses multiple keys for encryption and it 
requires extra certification from the Wi-Fi Alliance. There are two modes of key 
management for WPA and WPA2: pre-shared key (PSK) mode and 802.Ix which are 
designed for personal usage and company usage, respectively. 
CHAPTER2.BACKGROUND 32 
MAC Header 
Framed Packet MPDU 
(a) Encryption (b) Decryption 
Fig. 2.4. CCMP Encryption in IEEE 802.11i (27). 
Counter with CBC-MAC mode protocol (CCMP) is currently the strongest security 
protocol in WP A2, which uses CCM mode of operation based on AES. CCMP defines 
multiple rules to encrypt and decrypt the data frame in Wi-Fi and offers better integrity 
and confidentiality for the whole data packet by incorporating the packet header into the 
operation process. The whole encryption and decryption system provides greater security 
for MPDU (MAC Protocol Data Unit), which are illustrated in Fig. 2.4. 
2) Cryptography Applied to WP ANs 
A wireless personal area network (WP AN) is a type of network, which serves to 
interconnect computing devices, typically centering at a person 's workspace. These 
devices may be a computer, PDA, cell phone, printer, mouse, etc .. Bluetooth and Zigbee 
are two typical technologies used in WP ANs, catering to the need of low cost and low 
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power. Both Bluetooth and Zigbee operate on a wideband radio with a high frequency of 
2.4GHz, and a single chip usually integrates the RF transceiver with the security 
processing (such as data encryption and MAC generation) for the purpose of low cost, 
such as CC2420 and CC2540 [28], which integrate security processing with Zigbee and 
Bluetooth RF transceiver, respectively. 
Here, we briefly review the two technologies and show how security is applied: 
• Bluetooth 
Bluetooth holds a master-slave structure as shown in Fig. 2.5. In a Bluetooth network, 
one master device and up to seven slave devices constitute a piconet. Several piconets 
together can form a larger network called a scatternet [ 16]. 
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,,~.~ J ~ 
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:e/ )tJ 
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eJ /¥'slave 
maste~ ~ 
scatternet 
Fig. 2.5. Architecture of Bluetooth network. 
slave 
NIST has published a guide to Bluetooth security [31] to provide suggestions on 
specific security methods for Bluetooth technologies. In this document, it defines four 
security modes, which can be divided into three types of services: 
• Non-secure service: mode I belongs to this type, which bypasses all the security 
considerations. 
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• Service level enforced security: mode 2 and mode 4 belong to this type of service, 
which initializes after the link setup. 
• Link level enforced security: mode 3 belongs to this type, which initializes before 
the link setup. 
Pairing is an important process for both service level and link level enforced security, 
which helps two devices establish a relationship by creating a link key. Before Bluetooth 
v2.1 , a PIN code is used for pairing, called legacy pairing, which allows the 
communication between two devices if they enter the same PIN code and provides 
encryption and authentication using a generated link key. However, for newer versions, 
the secure simple pairing (SSP) is used for simplifying the pairing process, which utilizes 
ECDH public key cryptography proposed by NIST. 
• Zigbee 
Zig bee is a specification for WP ANs, including IEEE 802.15.4 of version 2003 [29] 
for the physical layer and link layer. It is designed to satisfy the requirement of low data 
rate and power context, such as home automation, entertainment and toys. Zigbee 
technology is designed to be easier and less expensive than Bluetooth and typically used 
in a device supplied by small battery. It supports three types of network topology as 
shown in Fig. 2.6. In this figure, there are three types of Zigbee devices: 
• Zigbee coordinator (ZC) , which manages the whole network and there is only 
one ZC device inside the network 
• Zigbee router (ZR), which functions as an intermediate router and pass data for 
other devices 
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• Zigbee end device (ZED), which can only communicate with ZC and ZR and it 
cannot relay data for other devices 
ZED 
Star Tree Mesh 
Fig. 2.6 Network topology of Zig bee. 
Zigbee provides information security by symmetric key cryptography. The ZC device 
is used as a trust centre, which in charge of cryptographic key establishment and 
transportation, data frame protection, and device management. Each Zigbee device is 
preloaded with the address ofthe trust centre and a unique key called master key, which 
is used for an end-to-end secure communication between the device and trust centre. Link 
key and network key are two types of keys, which are established, distributed by the trust 
center, and used for peer-to-peer communication and broadcast communication, 
respectively. All the three type of keys (master key, link key and network key) are 128 
bits long and used by cipher AES with CCM* mode, which is a minor variation of CCM 
providing additional CCM features such as encryption-only and integrity-only. 
3) Cryptography Applied to MANETs 
Mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) are popular due to their flexible style of 
communication. MANETs are infrastructureless: each node within the network functions 
----------------------------------------------------
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as a packet forwarder, as well as a host. Routing in MANETs becomes critical since the 
node's mobility makes the topology of network change dynamically. Cryptographic 
schemes in MANETs especially focus on ensuring the safety of routing, since the 
dynamically changed routing information directly determines whether a data packet can 
be successfully delivered to the destination node. However, the limited resources, such as 
bandwidth and processing capability, make it impossible for a MANET to implement 
complicated protocols as in the Internet. 
In MANETs, confidentiality is optional and even may not be necessary since the 
routing information itself is by broadcast throughout the network. More importantly, as 
MANET is a multi-hop network, the encryption and decryption for messages at each hop 
will introduce timing delay, which is not desired when the network topology is frequently 
changed. A signature is typically used to provide the information integrity and identity 
authentication. Am essage will be accepted by the receiver only when it passes the 
verification, otherwise, it will be dropped. Both symmetric key and asymmetric key 
cryptography can be used to generate the signature according to the security level 
required. The asymmetric key cryptography can provide higher level of security; however, 
shared secret key among a group of trusted nodes is also acceptable. Although it is 
generally believed that a group key cannot be used for authenticating the identity since 
each node that knows the key can generate the message, a tradeoff is made between the 
cost and the security level. 
Currently proposed security protocols for MANETs are mostly developed from 
extending existing routing protocols. For example, researchers develop security schemes 
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 37 
based on optimized link state routing (OLSR) [32], which is a proactive link state 
protocol designed for MANET and has been accepted in RFC3626. OLSR follows the 
layering design like in the Internet and the routing message uses user datagram protocol 
(UDP) with .the port number 698. 
. .. 
Fig. 2.7. OLSR protocol structure J32j. 
The general concept of the OLSR protocol is illustrated in Fig. 2.7, where one node is 
chosen as an example to describe the basic idea. As shown in figure (a), a central node 
can communicate with other nodes in the network through the wireless media. Nodes in 
the first circle around the central node are called one-hop neighbors. Neighbors of these 
one-hop neighbors (i.e., the second circle from the central node) are called two-hop 
neighbors of the central node. The central node selects some nodes within its one-hop 
neighbors as illustrated in figure (b). These selected nodes are called multipoint relay 
(MPR) nodes and via which the central node can reach all its two-hop neighbors. OLSR 
protocol includes two major processes: (1) Hello message flooding, where each node 
periodically broadcast its status and decides the MPR set and ( 2) Topology control 
message broadcast, where each node periodically broadcast who is selected as its MPR 
and the information to be used to generate the routing table. 
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Security extensions proposed for OLSR can be divided into two categories: end-to-end 
schemes and hop-by-hop schemes [33]. An end-to-end scheme treats every node along 
the routing path as a forward node except the source and destination nodes. The signature 
is generated by the source node and verified by the destination node, that is to say, other 
nodes along the path will not verify the signature. Unlike the end-to-end scheme, in a 
hop-by-hop scheme, routing information is aggregated and every node along the routing 
path will verify the signature. If the message passes the verification, the old signature will 
be removed. The node will add new information into the packet and append its own 
signature. Whether MPR nodes have retransmitted the message out is a critical factor to 
detect attacks in MANET when OLSR is applied. To solve this problem, a scheme, called 
SA-OLSR, is proposed where a node can detect malicious MPR nodes by receiving 
acknowledgement messages from its two-hop neighbors [34]. Although it will greatly 
increase the overhead of communication to include the ACK messages, the attack 
problem can be effectively solved in this scheme. 
2.2 Cryptography Applied to WSNs 
There is no unified security solution for wireless sensor networks, and neither for the 
cryptography applied to it. In this section, we focus on reviewing the state-of-the-art 
work for cryptography applied to WSNs. We focus on the study of currently available 
cryptographic algorithms and schemes, and particularly study the notion of secure data 
aggregation and typical architectures for secure WSNs. 
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2.2.1 Cryptographic Algorithms 
1) Symmetric Ciphers vs. Asymmetric Ciphers 
Many researchers focus on recommending appropriate ciphers for WSNs considering 
the constrained resources in a sensor device. Results show that symmetric key ciphers are 
more practical than asymmetric key ciphers to be used in a sensor node since the 
computational complexity of asymmetric key cryptographic algorithms introduce much 
more energy cost. The large difference of energy cost can be seen from Table 2.1 , which 
is an analysis result of energy cost between asymmetric key cipher and symmetric key 
cipher according to [35]. 
Table 2.1. Energy cost comparison: asymmetric vs. symmetric 1351. 
Asymmetric key cryptographic algorithm energy consumption 
Algorithm Data size (bits) 
Signature (mJ) Key exchange (mJ) 
Sign Verify Client Server 
RSA-1024· 1024 304 11.9 15.4 304 
ESCSA-160 160 22.82 45.09 22.3 22.3 
RSA-2048 2048 2302.7 53.7 57.2 2302.7 
ECDSA-224 224 61.54 121.98 60.4 60.4 
Symmetric key cryptographic algorithm energy consumption (mJ/Byte) 
SHA-1 0.0059 
AES-128 Encryption 0.00162 
Although asymmetric key ciphers consume much more energy than symmetric key 
ciphers, there are still some researchers showing interest in this field because asymmetric 
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ciphers are more convenient for the key establishment and identity authentication [36] 
[37]. However, the huge overhead of energy cost is still the largest problem. 
2) Block Ciphers vs. Stream Ciphers 
Researchers focus on evaluating the efficiency of symmetric key ciphers in WSNs 
from two aspects: memory cost and CPU cycles, such as in [38] and [39]. 
• Block cipher 
The performance of block ciphers varies from their different characteristics, such as 
the key size, the block size and the number of rounds. There are three main components 
for a block cipher, which are typically involved in an evaluation: encryption algorithm, 
decryption algorithm and key scheduling algorithm. Many popular block ciphers have 
been investigated, such as AES [10], Skipjack [40], RCS [41], RC6 [42], Twofish [43], 
MISTY! [44], KASUMI [45], Camellia [46], etc., and we briefly list their parameters in 
Table 2.2. 
a e .. T bl 2 2 Ch aractenshcs o popu ar oc c1p1 ers. f I bl k . h 
Cipher Block size (Bytes) Key size (Bytes) Number of rounds 
AES 16 16 10 
Skipjack 8 10 32 
RCS 8 16 12 
RC6 16 16 20 
Twofish 16 16 16 
MISTY1 8 16 8 
KASUMI 8 16 8 
Camellia 16 16 18 
In recent years, many lightweight block ciphers have been proposed to meet the low 
area and low power consumption requirements, such as ICEBERG [47], PRESENT [48], 
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HIGHT [49], SEA [50], and PUFFIN (51]. These compact ciphers typically have smaller 
block sizes and S-boxes. Characteristics of these ciphers are shown in Table 2.3. The 
reason we list these ciphers here is that they might become good candidates for WSNs to 
provide energy efficiency and acceptable security level at the same time. 
Table 2.3. Characteristics of lightweight block ciphers. 
Cipher S-box Block size (Bytes) Key size (Bytes) # ofrounds 
ICEBERG 4x4 8 16 16 
PRESENT 4X4 8 10 or 16 31 
HIGHT 4x4 8 16 32 
PUFFIN 4x4 8 16 32 
SEA 3x3 variable variable variable 
• Stream Ciphers 
Stream ciphers are not as much understood as block ciphers (which provide flexible 
functionalities like block encryption, stream encryption and MAC generation). However, 
since a stream cipher does not propagate errors introduced by the communication channel, 
i.e., an error bit in the ciphertext only produces one error bit in the recovered plaintext, 
there is also on-going research focusing on energy evaluation of stream ciphers in WSNs. 
The recently investigated stream ciphers include: HC-128 (52], HC-256 [53], 
SOSEANUK [54], SNOW (55], Phelix [56], Dragon (57], LEX [58], RC4 [59], etc .. In 
[60], these modern stream ciphers are evaluated on an 8-bit AVR MCU to show the 
appropriateness of implementing stream ciphers in small microprocessors, which happens 
to be a typical implementation environment used by a sensor node. In addition, in (39], 
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the stream ciphers are especially analyzed for WSN purposes according to the number of 
CPU cycles and memory requirements. 
3) Modes of Operation 
A mode of operation is a scheme to make use of a symmetric key block cipher when 
operating on a large bulk of data [61 ]. There are five basic modes as shown in Fig. 2.8, 
which provide considerable advantages to a block cipher, especially making its 
application more efficient to satisfy different requirements in a practical environment. 
Electronic codebook (ECB) mode and cipher block chaining (CBC) mode operate on the 
plaintext block by block, while cipher feedback (CFB) mode, output feedback (OFB) 
mode, and counter (CTR) mode make the block cipher function like a stream cipher. In 
WSNs, many encryption schemes have been proposed to utilize the basic modes of 
operation, such as SPINS using CTR mode [62] and TinySec using CBC mode [63]. 
The ciphertext size will be different according to the operation mode being used, 
which is summarized as follows: 
• Ciphertext Size Equals Multiple ofBlock Size 
ECB mode and CBC mode belongs to this case, which is illustrated as Fig. 2.8 (a) and 
(b), respectively. The plaintext will be padded with bits, for example, some zeroes, to 
make the size of plaintext be a multiple of the block size. 
ECB mode is the most straightforward mode for block ciphers, which encrypts blocks 
of plaintext directly into blocks of ciphertext. It is considered ideal for encrypting small 
size plaintext. However, it is vulnerable to attacks when encrypting large amounts of data, 
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since the same plaintext always results in the same ciphertext and a codebook for 
plaintext and ciphertext pair can be created. CBC mode is generally utilized to encrypt 
large bulks of data and overcome the ECB security flaw by using an initialization vector 
(IV). CBC mode functions like a chain, each block of ciphertext is obtained by 
encrypting the result of the previous ciphertext block XORed with the current plaintext 
block, except that the first block is generated by XORing plaintext with the IV. 
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Fig. 2.8. Basic mode of operation on block ciphers. 
• Ciphertext Size Equals Plaintext Size 
It is the characteristic of a stream cipher that the ciphertext size equals the plaintext 
size and need not be a multiple of a block size. For a block cipher, three operation modes 
can achieve this characteristic: CFB mode, OFB mode and CTR mode, which are 
illustrated in Fig. 2.8 (c), (d) and (e), respectively. 
CFB mode and OFB mode function similarly by using the feedback of previous results 
stored in a register. The value of the register is initialized by IV and encrypted by the 
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cipher key to generate keystream. The size of feedback ranges from one to the block size. 
CTR mode functions like a stream cipher, generating keystream by encrypting the value 
of a counter, which is initialized by IV and incremented by one for each block. All these 
three modes involve only the block encryption function, which means the same function 
is performed at both the sides of sender and receiver. 
Besides the five basic modes of operation, there are also many advanced modes of 
operation proposed in recent years. Some modes of operation integrate the cipher 
operation and MAC generation together, providing encryption, integrity and 
authentication in one pass of a block cipher operation. Such modes of operation include 
Galois/counter (GCM) mode [64], offset codebook (OCB) mode [65], and counter with 
CBC-MAC (CCM) mode [27]. In [66], the advanced modes of operation are evaluated 
through the implementation in a sensor node according to the code size and the number 
of CPU cycles. Among these modes, OCB mode is the most popular one, which is 
proposed to be used by many cryptographic schemes for WSNs [67][68][69] . 
Fig. 2.9. CBC-MAC generation. 
In a cryptographic scheme, a MAC can provide both data integrity and data 
authentication simultaneously. A typical CBC-MAC is illustrated in Fig. 2.9. Using a 
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MAC instead of a checksum is necessary in a WSN since both the channel quality and a 
malicious attack can influence the correctness of a received message. At the receiver side, 
to eliminate the potential possibility of malicious attack, a packet will be dropped if the 
recalculated MAC value does not equal the one transmitted. 
2.2.2 Cryptographic Schemes 
From the cryptographic scheme point of view, there are two separate stages: key 
establishment and normal communication with the established key. We will discuss these 
two stages respectively. 
1) Secure Data Transmission 
The normal data transmission constitutes the major secure communication process in 
WSNs. Compared to other networks, there are no obvious protocol stack layers in WSNs 
and the data transmission of a sensor is typically protected at the link layer. Most 
schemes proposed for secure data transmission utilize symmetric key cryptographic 
algorithms due to the limited resources provided by a sensor device. As security 
requirements for a sensor node, the data transmitted needs to be protected from being 
eavesdropped and altered. Although there exist energy efficient lightweight 
communication protocols like Zigbee, the optimization of security schemes for WSNs is 
especially needed from the energy consumption perspective. 
• SPINS 
SPINS is a suite of security protocols proposed for WSNs with consideration of 
optimizing energy cost for a sensor device [62]. SPINS includes two parts: secure 
network encryption protocol (SNEP) and micro timed efficient streaming loss-tolerant 
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authentication (J.!TESLA). It is worth noting that in [62] there is no specific discussion of 
the implementation details. 
SNEP is used to provide data confidentiality, authentication, integrity and freshness by 
using cipher RC5 with a counter mode of operation. For data encryption, the encryption 
result Cis obtained by C = EK(D), which means using encryption key K to encrypt the 
plaintext data D . For MAC generation, the MAC value M is calculated by M = 
EKMAC(CIE) , which means using the MAC key KMAC applying CBC-MAC on the 
concatenated message CIE. In this scheme, the counter value is incremented after each 
message, such that different ciphertexts will be transmitted even for the same message. 
At the receiver, if the recalculated MAC value passes the verification, the identity of the 
sender is verified. The counter in the MAC can prevent the attacker from replaying the 
message and it is maintained by periodic synchronization between the transmitter and 
receiver. 
Fig. 2.10. Authentication flow for !JTESLA. 
J.!TESLA is an authentication scheme for broadcasting, which introduces the idea of 
delayed disclosure of symmetric keys. The authentication flow is shown in Fig. 2.1 0, 
which is based on the loose time synchronization between the base station and nodes. The 
key for generating the MAC is produced by a public one-way function Ki = F(Ki+l) 
(such as by MD5). A message encrypted by key Ki cannot be authenticated as soon as it 
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is received. The node needs to buffer the message until the key Ki+l is broadcasted after a 
period of time, then using Ki+l to calculate Ki so that the message can be authenticated. 
• TinySec and Its Derivatives 
TinySec [63] is another popular encryption scheme proposed for link layer security in 
WSNs. TinySec presents all the specifics for implementation and shows the 
implementation results tested on the sensor node Mica2. In this scheme, block cipher 
Skipjack is used with CBC mode of operation and the initialization vector (IV) used for 
encryption is transmitted within each packet. To reduce the packet size transmitted by a 
sensor node, TinySec decreases the valid size of IV to 16 bits and utilizes the ciphertext 
stealing technique of CBC mode of operation. 
There are many encryption schemes proposed after TinySec for better performance, 
such as MiniSec [67], FlexiSec [68], ContikiSec [69] , and SenSec [70]. The 
improvements mainly focus on different aspects of cryptography, such as the 
cryptographic algorithm, the mode of operation, and the IV distribution. SenSec focuses 
on using Skipjack-X instead of Skipjack for better security and using XCBC mode for 
one-pass encryption and authentication [70]. MiniSec combines the characteristics of 
SPINS and TinySec, and utilizes several bits that are borrowed from the field of packet 
header to transmit fewer bits of the counter value. ContikiSec focuses on designing an 
operating system, which uses a valid 16-bit IV (the same as TinySec) and OCB mode of 
operation (the same as MiniSec). FlexiSec focuses on the configurability and provides 
nine security modes for different application contexts, such as only authentication 
without encryption, encryption with 64-bit MAC or 32-bit MAC and so on. 
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In Table 2.4, we briefly summarize the link layer security schemes proposed for 
WSNs. From this table, we can see that a cryptographic scheme is a combination of 
different aspects of cryptography, which need to be carefully designed to achieve the 
requirement of energy efficiency in a WSN. 
Table 2.4. Characteristics of secure data transmission schemes. 
Scheme Year Cipher Mode MAC Sensor nodes 
SPINS 2001 RCS CTR CBC Mica2 
Tiny Sec 2004 Skipjack CBC CBC Mica2 
Sen Sec 2005 Skipjack-X CBC-X CBC-X Mica2 
Mini Sec 2007 Skipjack OCB OCB Telos motes 
ContikiSec 2009 AES OCB OCB MSB-430 
FlexiSec 2009 XXTEAorAES OCB OCB orCBC Mica2 
2) Secure Key Distribution 
Keys establishment in WSNs is important since the security in distributing the 
encryption key provides the basic insurance for secure data transmission. Currently, there 
is much research focusing on this area and proposing schemes for key establishment and 
management. These schemes can be divided into centralized schemes and distributed 
schemes based on whether there is a key distribution centre in the network or not. In 
addition, key establishment schemes can be divided into deterministic schemes and 
probabilistic schemes, according to whether there is a key ring preloaded in the sensor 
node before its deployment or not [ 1]. 
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Most research about key establishment in WSNs focuses on symmetric key 
cryptography due to its lower computational cost. However, there are inevitable 
disadvantages introduced by symmetric key cryptography for key establishment, such as 
more complicated distribution process and management. Localized encryption and 
authentication protocol (LEAP) is a typical key establishment scheme in WSNs, which is 
a distributed and deterministic scheme using symmetric key cryptography [71]. LEAP 
includes four types of encryption keys, which are explained in Table 2.5 and these keys 
are used for different purposes. One of the major advantages for LEAP is that it can 
extremely constrain the attacking range. A compromised node can only construct 
relationshjps with its previous neighbors. As a result, a sensor node will not be accepted 
as a neighbor by other nodes if it was deployed in other places. Therefore, the range 
under attack will be effectively constrained to its previous neighbors. 
Table 2.5. Four types of keys in LEAP. 
Key type Description 
Individual key Shared between the node and the base station, which is unique and preloaded in the sensor node before deployment 
Pair-wise key Shared between one-hop neighbor nodes 
Cluster key Shared among multiple neighbor nodes for secure locally broadcast 
Group key Used for base station broadcasts messages and shared among all the nodes. 
Asymmetric key cryptography (e.g. RSA and ECC) has obvious advantages for key 
establishment, such as easier key management and more reliable identity authentication. 
However, they are not recommended for WSNs applications due to the large 
computational energy cost. Some research studies the possibility of using public key 
CHAPTER2.BACKGROUND 50 
cryptography for key establishment in a WSN under certain assumptions. For example, in 
[72], the authors perform an analysis of the energy cost for cryptographic key 
establishment and results show that the total energy cost using ECC can even achieve 
better result than using symmetric key cipher when the key needs to be established in an 
environment of multi-hop communication. However, there is unfairness in the 
comparison in that the total energy cost used in the comparison includes the energy cost 
of all the nodes participating, even the base station which does not generally suffer from 
the same harsh energy constraints as the sensor nodes. In addition, this analysis does not 
consider the effects of a noisy channel. 
2.2.3 Secure Data Aggregation 
Since the energy shortage is a major problem in WSNs, data aggregation is widely 
utilized, offering an efficient way to enhance the transmission efficiency by reducing 
redundant message information. Although the process of aggregation introduces extra 
computational energy cost, energy is saved by reducing the number of data bits 
transmitted since communication consumes much more energy than computation. 
Another reason for implementing aggregation is that, from the information entropy point 
of view, transmitting all the raw data to the base station through the network may be not 
efficient, because sensor nodes are typically densely deployed, data gathered from nearby 
nodes may have great correlations or even overlap each other. Moreover, besides energy 
cost savings, reducing the redundancy can also reduce the network traffic and avoid data 
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congestion. The functions for data aggregation in WSNs includes sum, average, median, 
minimum, maximum and count, which are described in Table 2.6. 
Table 2.6. Function of data aggregation. 
Function Description 
n 
Sum f(st ,s2, ... ,sn) =Lsi 
i=l 
n 
Average {(St ,S2, ... ,Sn) =(LSi) jn 
i= l 
f(st, S2, ···, Sn) = S(r) ; 
Median n+1 
r = -
2
- ; s(t)• s(2), ... , s(n) is a sorted order of s1 , s2, ... , sn 
Minimum f(s1 , S2, ... , S0 ) =Min {sdi = 1,2, ... , n} 
Maximum f(s1 ,s21 ••• ,S0 ) =Max {sdi = 1,2, . . . , n} 
Count f(s1 ,s2, ... ,s0 ) =I {sdi = 1,2, ... ,n}l 
Security plays an important role for data aggregation in WSNs since the whole data 
sent from sensor nodes are ruined if an aggregator is compromised. Recent research 
focuses on two types of aggregation flow: hop-by-hop and end-to-end [73]. The 
difference between the two flows is focused on the data aggregation process as shown in 
Fig. 2.11. In hop-by-hop flow, the aggregation is processed after decrypting the data 
received from each node and then the aggregation data is encrypted again and transmitted 
to the base station. In contrast, end-to-end flow does not include decryption. The 
aggregation is processed on the collected ciphertext directly, which is done by using a 
cryptographic algorithm with characteristics of private homomorphism (PH). PH includes 
two types: additive PH and multiplicative PH, which are given by a+ b = Dk(Ek(a) + 
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Ek(b)) and ax b = Dk(Ek(a) x Ek(b)), respectively. Some cryptographic algorithms 
have the PH feature, such as RSA and ECC-EIGamal for asymmetric key cipher, and 
Domingo-Ferrer [74] and HSC [75] for symmetric key ciphers. 
Session key generation 
Construct a low energy cost 
transmission structure, the 
details depend on the model 
Each node encrypts the data by 
session key and send the 
Encrypted data to aggregator; 
Aggregator decrypts the data 
and process aggregation. 
Aggregator encrypts the 
aggregation result and sends it 
to the base station. 
Make sure the results satisfy the 
requirement of security: integrity, 
confidentiality, authentication 
Data Aggregation 
Data transmission 
Security certification 
Each node encrypts data by 
session key and send it to the 
aggregator 
Aggregator process aggregation 
and hOmomorphic encryption, 
such as ECC. 
Notice: No decryption here 
Aggregator sends the result to 
--- the base station 
Fig. 2.11. Data aggregation flow: hop-by-hop vs. end-to end. 
In recent years, many schemes have been proposed for secure data aggregation. We 
list some typical ones in Table 2.7. 
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 53 
Table 2.7. Schemes of data aggregation in WSNs. 
Protocol name Feature 
Secure Data Aggregation SDA does not provide confidentiality and use 
(SDA) [76] the second hop for authentication. 
Secure Information Aggregation SIA includes only one aggregator and 
(SIA) [77] implement Merkle hash tree to committed 
value. 
Secure Reference-Based Data Aggregation SRDA only support confidentiality and just 
(SRDA) [78] send differential value. 
Secure Hierarchical Data Aggregation SHDA is similar to SIA, except including 
(SHDA) [79] multiple aggregators. Merkle hash tree is also 
used. 
Secure hop-by-hop Data Aggregation Protocol 
SOAP increases the number of aggregators 
and using logical sub-tree for committed (SOAP) [80] 
values. 
Concealed Data Aggregation CDA only provide confidentiality, using end-
(CDA) [81] to-end flow by PH method. 
2.3 Summary 
In this chapter, we have reviewed cryptographic protocols for popular networks, such 
as the Internet for wired network, and WLANs, WPANs, and MANETs for wireless 
networks. We especially focused on reviewing the state-of-the-art work for security 
schemes applied to WSNs. We discussed the different aspects of cryptography applied to 
WSNs, such as the cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic schemes. We also 
introduced secure data aggregation, a popular architecture in secure WSNs to achieve 
better energy efficiency. We can see that, for different network requirements, the 
corresponding security schemes are different. The Internet focuses on security schemes at 
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different protocol layers. WLANs focus on the data safety by continuously enhancing the 
security level of the protocols (from WEP, WPA, to WPA2). WPANs focus on low 
complexity and low power by using a chip to integrate both the security scheme with low 
power transceiver (such as Bluetooth and Zigbee). MANETs focus on the security of 
routing information due to its dynamically changing topology. Unlike these types of 
networks, WSNs focus on using energy efficient cryptographic schemes with suitable 
security since the constrained energy is a large problem for a sensor device. 
Chapter 3 
METHOD TO EVALUATE ENERGY COST IN SECURE WSNS 
This chapter presents the method of evaluating energy cost in a sensor node when 
cryptography is applied to WSNs. In applications requiring security, a cryptographic 
algorithm is used to encrypt the data in order to avoid malicious attacks such as message 
eavesdropping and altering. However, at the same time, cryptography introduces more 
energy cost, not only for the computational cost brought in by data processing, but also 
for the communication cost brought in by the cryptographic schemes. The challenge is for 
the sensor node to transmit successfully as much information as possible in the sensor 
node's limited life span. Equivalently, it is desirable to minimize the energy consumed 
for each successfully transmitted bit of information to maximize the life span of the 
sensor node. It is especially important to consider this objective in the context of the 
communication environment, which is noisy due to the wireless medium, resulting in data 
packets inevitably being transmitted with errors. 
In this chapter, we aim to present the method to evaluate the energy cost of a secure 
sensor node, including both the computational cost and communication cost. We also 
investigate a case including no security features, which provides a baseline for further 
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energy perfonnance investigation. We will focus on (I) evaluating the energy cost of a 
sensor node and (2) investigating different factors that affect the energy efficiency of a 
sensor node, such as the payload size and the channel quality. 
3.1 Cryptography Implemented in WSNs 
In many WSNs, the confidentiality of data is often critical since the information 
transmitted may relate to a disaster alarm (such as earthquake and forest fire) or private 
information (such as the health condition of a human being). For this purpose, we focus 
on exploring the cryptographic algorithm and scheme for the basic communication 
behaviour of a sensor node: encrypting the sensor data and transmitting the ciphertext 
out. As we know, symmetric key cryptographic algorithms include two types of ciphers: 
stream ciphers and block ciphers. A stream cipher typically operates on one bit of data 
each time by XORing the generated keystream with plaintext; while, a block cipher 
operates on a block size of data (typically 64 bits or 128 bits) by iterating rounds of 
simple cryptographic operations, such as nonlinear substitution and linear transfonnation. 
The same cipher key is used for both the encryption and decryption, which is assumed 
already known by the sensor node. This cipher key can be embedded inside the sensor 
node device before its deployment or be established by a specialized key agreement at the 
beginning of the communication. In WSNs, encryption is used to achieve the 
confidentiality between two communicating sides, preventing the potentially sensitive 
information from being obtained by an inappropriate party. At the same time, a message 
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authentication code (MAC) [61] is transmitted in a packet, so that the receiver side can 
use it to judge the validity of a packet. 
3.2 Performance Comparison Metric: Energy Efficiency 
In a WSN, energy and security are two key considerations. Although security is a 
design goal, it is not practical to evaluate a cryptographic algorithm or scheme by taking 
the security level as a metric. Although security schemes can be identified to have 
weaknesses, such flaws are not always evident or easily quantifiable. Hence, we shall 
assume that schemes using accepted cryptographic methods with reasonable block and 
key sizes are secure, and the metric we shall use to evaluate the cryptographic 
performance in a WSN is based on the energy consumption. We choose as a metric the 
amount of valid information successfully transmitted from the sensor node per Joule of 
energy consumed in the transmission process and refer to this metric as energy efficiency. 
Because our focus is security, we consider only the energy costs of the security scheme in 
a sensor node and ignore the energy requirement of other types of processing. 
The valid information successfully transmitted refers to the data in packets that is 
received and decrypted correctly. That is to say, if a packet is transmitted with a 
corruption of its start symbol or packet header, the packet is not taken as valid since the 
receiver will not receive it. As well, if other fields of the packet are corrupted, the MAC 
verification will fail and the data will be discarded and considered not valid. Many 
factors will influence the energy cost of valid data bits transmitted by a sensor node. In 
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the following sections, we will analyze it from both the perspective of the cryptographic 
algorithm and the applied cryptographic scheme. 
3.3 Energy Cost Calculation 
In WSNs, the energy cost of a sensor device mainly consists of two parts: the 
communication cost and the computational cost. For communication energy cost, we 
consider the transmitting and receiving energy cost; while for computational cost, we 
consider the encryption cost and MAC calculation cost. For the purposes of our analysis, 
some types of energy are ignored, such as the energy cost when sensor is in the sleep 
mode, the computational costs of data processing other than encryption and MAC 
generation, etc .. 
3.3.1 Sensor Node Primitive Description 
In our research, the energy cost calculation references to the sensor node structure of 
the Mica series [82], which are representative products that have been studied and used 
widely in recent years. However, it is worth noting that analysis results will be similar 
when applied to other sensor products. 
Fig. 3.1. Typical packet format for a sensor node. 
The major work of a sensor node includes sensing data from the environment, 
processing the collected data by a microprocessor (for example, the 8-bit Atmel 
Atmega 128 CPU), and transmitting messages out with small size packets (typically not 
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larger than 30 bytes). Fig. 3.1 shows a typical packet format of a sensor node derived 
from TinySec [63], and its notation is explained in Table 3.1. In this figure, the IV can be 
transmitted with the payload or be transmitted independently, determined by the specific 
cryptographic scheme (which will be explicitly explained in the following chapters). 
Table 3.1. Notation used in the packet format. 
Symbol Size (bits) Description 
START SYMBOL Nss Start symbol used for medium access. 
DEST Destination address of the receiver 
AM 
Nhd 
Active message handler type 
LEN 
(sum) 
Size ofthe packet 
IV Niv Initialization vector 
PAYLOAD Nptd Payload, usually variable 
MAC Nmac Message authentication code 
3.3.2 Communication Energy Cost 
The energy cost of transmitting one packet (Etx) depends on the current in transmitting 
mode Utx), the voltage (U), the size of the packet (Npkt), and the bit rate oftransmission 
(R), and is given by 
Etx = Utx X U X Npkt)/R . (3 .1) 
Similarly, the energy cost of receiving one packet (Erx) can be expressed as 
Erx = Urx XU X Npkt)/R , (3 .2) 
where lrx is the current in receiving mode. 
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3.3.3 Computational Energy Cost 
As we discussed before, a sensor node is manufactured to be low power and low cost. 
Hence, most devices use an 8-bit microprocessor for data processing, such as one from 
the Atmel A VR ATmega series [83]. The computational energy cost by the 
microprocessor to process a particular operation (such as a block encryption) can be 
calculated as 
(3.3) 
where Pcpu represents the CPU's power and T0 p represents the time to execute the 
operation which can be further calculated by the CPU's frequency ([cpu) and the 
number of operation cycles being used (C0 p)· 
When cryptography is applied to a WSN, we mainly consider two parts of 
computational energy cost: encryption and MAC generation. We calculate the energy by 
determining the number of CPU cycles used to finish the cryptographic processing. Two 
factors affect the computational energy cost: the cipher algorithm efficiency and the 
payload size. When considering the use of a symmetric key cipher, the block size is an 
important parameter in the energy cost calculation, as this determines how many 
encryption operations are carried out. From the perspective of the sensor node, whose 
main function is to transmit collected sensor information, the encryption and MAC 
processing energy costs per packet (Eenc and Emac• respectively) are given by: 
Eenc = (Pcpu X Cenc/fcpu) X rNptdfbl, (3.4) 
Emac = (Pcpu X Cmac)/fcpu X [(Npkt- Nss - Nmac)/bmacl. (3.5) 
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where Cenc and Cmac represent the number of clock cycles required to encrypt one block 
and generate MAC value, respectively and Npld represents the payload size in bits. For a 
block cipher, b is the block size. While for a stream cipher, b represents the keystream 
block size, which is the amount of keystream produced at one time. The symbol r.l 
denotes the ceiling operator. Note that we are assuming that the MAC is produced using a 
block cipher of block size bmac in CBC mode [61] and is applied across all fields of the 
packets except the start symbol. 
3.4 A Case Study: An Unsecured WSN 
In this section, we focus on evaluating the energy performance of a case that a wireless 
sensor node transmits data without encryption and leave the an alysis of secure data 
transmission for the following chapters. In this case, we especially consider different 
factors affecting the energy cost of a sensor node such as the payload size and the channel 
quality. 
3.4.1 Energy Cost Calculation 
The packet format is shown in Fig. 3.2, including a start symbol, packet header, 
payload and a CRC checksum. The energy cost of a sensor node is calculated as the sum 
of the communication and computational energy costs. 
N,. Nhu Npla Ncr,-. 
START SYMBOL DEST I AM I LEN PAYLOAD CRC 
Fig. 3.2. Packet format for a sensor node without encryption. 
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The energy cost oftransmitting one packet can be calculated using (3.1), which can be 
expressed as 
(3.6) 
Since the CRC is transmitted within the packet, the computational cost of calculating 
the CRC value by the microprocessor should be included. Using (3.3), we can obtain the 
computational energy cost for one data packet: 
(3 .7) 
where Cere represents the number of cycles to compute the CRC operation per block of 
size here · For the assembly implementation result provided by Atmel A VR [84], Cere = 
175 cycles and here = 16 bits. 
3.4.2 Channel Quality Consideration 
For the unsecured network, although we consider the case that no malicious attacks are 
applied in the network, there is still a chance that bits ofthe packet are corrupted since it 
is transmitted through the noisy wireless media. As a result, information transmitted 
within the packet is sometimes not valid (as indicated by a failed CRC check, here we 
assume CRC detects all the errors). 
The probability that a packet has one or more bit errors is decided by two factors : the 
probability of error for each bit (pe) and the size of the packet (Npkt) . The probability that 
a received packet has no errors (P0 ) is expressed as 
(3.6) 
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where it is assumed that bit errors occur randomly and independently. By using this, we 
can evaluate the amount of valid information successfully transmitted by a sensor node. 
3.4.3 Calculation of Valid Data Transferred 
The total number of data bits transmitted successfully for a given energy cost (e.g. 
Joule) is given by 
7J = n X Npld X P0 , (3.7) 
which depends on three factors: the number of the transmitted data packets, n (which can 
be calculated by a given energy cost 1 Joule), the payload size, Nptd• and the probability 
that the packet is transmitted correctly, P0 • 
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Fig. 3.3. Analysis of the valid data in wireless channel without encryption. 
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3.4.4 Analysis Result 
We plot the energy efficiency for a fixed size packet for the scenarios of an error-free 
channel and a noisy channel. The analysis result is shown in Fig. 3.3, where the 
parameters are based on the Mica sensor node and are listed in Table 3.2. Notice that we 
analyze the energy performance for a wide range of payload sizes. However, the sensor 
node typically transmits small size packets of less than 30 bytes. We extend the payload 
size to give a general perspective on the energy efficiency, which is affected by the 
channel quality and the payload size. 
Table 3.2. Parameters used in this analysis. 
Object Parameter Value Unit 
Cere 175 cycles 
CRC 
here 16 bits 
Pcpu 13.8 mW 
fcpu 8 MHz 
Sensor board lxmt 27 rnA 
u 3.3 v 
R 38400 bps 
Nss 8 bytes 
Packet Nhd 4 bytes 
Nptd from I to 500 bytes 
Channel BER 10-4, 0 -
As shown in the analysis result, for an error-free channel the energy efficiency first 
increases rapidly with the increase of the payload size, and then the rate of increase 
decreases and approximates to a fixed value. This trend can be explained by the overhead 
- ---------------------------------------------------------
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of the data packet. Since the channel is error-free, the larger payload size means relatively 
less energy consumed by transmitting the overhead ofthe packet. 
Consider now the cases for a noisy channel. Unlike the error-free channel, there is a 
maximum value for the energy efficiency, which is obtained at a certain payload size. 
When the payload size increases to very large values the energy efficiency decreases. 
This is the result of a balance between the packet size and the quality of the channel. 
When the channel is noisy, larger packet size will lead to larger probability of the data 
packet transmitted with error, which means more data bits transmitted are not valid and 
are discarded due to the failed CRC check of the reviewer. However, the invalid data 
packet also consumes energy thereby decreasing the sensor node's energy efficiency. 
3.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we first introduce the application of cryptography to a wireless sensor 
network, and then propose using energy efficiency, the amount of valid data transferred 
per Joule from a sensor node, as the metric to evaluate the performance when 
cryptography is applied to the sensor node communication. We give an explicit 
explanation for the energy cost of a sensor node including computational cost and 
communication cost, which is the major factor determining the life span of a sensor node. 
Finally, we study a case by analyzing the energy cost of a sensor node under the 
condition of a WSN without considering security. We focus on calculating the energy 
efficiency for a sensor node, and analyzing the factors, which affect the number of valid 
data bits transmitted, such as the payload size and the channel quality. Results show that 
,--------------------·---------------------
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in a noisy channel, there exists a balance between the payload size and the quality of the 
channel and the energy efficiency is affected by both these factors. We shall use this 
basic case as a point of comparison when considering the energy efficiency of 
cryptographic schemes applied to WSNs in the subsequent chapters. 
Chapter 4 
SOFTWARE-ORIENTED ENERGY COST OF 
CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS 
This chapter presents the energy cost evaluation for cryptographic algorithms 
implemented in a software-oriented sensor node. Selection of a suitable security scheme 
is critical in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) because of the open media broadcast 
communication and the limited energy supply of the sensor device [I]. To achieve the 
security requirements, several researchers have focused on evaluating cryptographic 
algorithms in WSNs [35][85] and proposing energy efficient ciphers [86][87]. Although 
the transmission of data is the most energy consuming activity in a wireless sensor node, 
it is also important to select an energy efficient cipher that will minimize the energy 
consumption ofthe energy constrained sensor node. 
In this chapter, we examine the energy efficiency of symmetric key cryptographic 
algorithms applied in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). In our study, we consider both 
stream ciphers and block ciphers. We implement the ciphers in software using assembly 
language and derive the computational energy cost of the ciphers under consideration by 
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comparing the number of CPU cycles required to perform encryption. After evaluating a 
number of symmetric key ciphers, we compare the energy performance of stream ciphers 
and block ciphers applied to a noisy channel in a WSN. From the analysis, we 
recommend using a lightweight block cipher referred to as byte-oriented substitution-
permutation network (BSPN), to achieve energy efficiency with a level of security 
suitable for wireless sensor networks. 
4.1 Software Implementation of Symmetric Key Ciphers 
In this section, we study different structures of symmetric key ciphers and evaluate 
their energy efficiency. We choose some typical stream ciphers and block ciphers to 
implement in assembly language based on an Atmel A VR microprocessor A Tmega 128. 
From the software implementation, we can obtain the number of CPU cycles and 
calculate the computational energy cost for a sensor node, which i s making use of 
cryptography. 
4.1.1 Platform of Software Implementation 
• ATmega128 and Simulation Tool 
Atmel ATmega128 [83] is an 8-bit microprocessor with low power and low cost, and 
it has been utilized by many sensor node devices, such as Mica series. It works at a clock 
frequency of up to 8MHz and has 4 KB of RAM and 128 KB of flash memory. There are 
32 x 8 general-purpose working registers and 133 instructions, most of which are 
executed in one cycle. A VR Studio is the software simulation tool for Atmel A VR 
microprocessors and supports both C language and assembly language. A VR Studio 
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provides the information of the resource utilization and the number of CPU cycles 
required to execute code. 
• C language vs. Assembly Language 
Although C language is easier to maintain and read, we choose assembly language to 
implement the cryptographic algorithms. Since the sensor node is energy-limited device, 
fewer the CPU cycles it operates, less the computational energy is consumed. Assembly 
language can especially satisfy this purpose because it offers a direct control of the CPU. 
Although C language can be compiled with optimization, it still results in a large number 
of redundant cycles. By using assembly language, we can precisely control the flow and 
fully utilize features provided by the hardware. 
4.1.2 Implementation Considerations 
Unlike hardware implementation, software implementation executes instructions in a 
relatively sequential manner and the specific implementation using assembly language 
directly follows the algorithm itself. T he efficiency of a software implementation is 
mainly based on the resources of microprocessor and its instruction set. 
Implementation depends on the specifics of the cryptographic algorithm. Different 
tradeoffs are possible to make the operation more efficient. For example, the utilization 
of a lookup table approach can often save a number of CPU cycles since the value can be 
obtained directly by accessing memory instead of slow and long CPU calculation. 
Sometimes even multiple lookup tables are generated to cater to this purpose. However, 
in a sensor node, the resources of the microprocessor are limited. Considering this 
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situation, we only use the lookup table approach for the S-box so that the sensor node can 
use memory for other purposes. 
4.1.3 Implementation of Block Ciphers 
We choose four block ciphers as candidates and consider the energy performance 
when applied to WSNs. These ciphers are chosen due to their different characteristics: 
AES [I 0) represents the most popular block cipher being used in recent years; Skipjack 
[ 40] is chosen for use in a commercial sensor product; as two lightweight block ciphers, 
Puffin (51] is designed for the hardware implementation purposes and BSPN [89] is 
efficient for 8-bit CPU operation. 
1) AES 
AES [I 0) is the most popularly deployed symmetric key cipher. Although, as we shall 
see, the energy cost per byte of AES is high, it is generally regarded as a secure choice 
when selecting ciphers for security schemes. 
AES is a block cipher with 128-bit block size and 128-bit (or larger) key size. The 
structure of AES is illustrated in Fig. 4.1, which includes ten rounds of operation and 
each round with four stages. The block of plaintext is divided into four rows and four 
columns with each byte as an element. The four stages of one round operation include 
substitute bytes, shift rows, mix columns and add round keys. In the first stage, the block 
is substituted using an 8x8 S-box byte by byte. In the second stage, a permutation is 
operated on each row of the block. Then in the third stage, a linear transformation is 
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operated column by column by multiplying a matrix. Finally, the round key is XORed 
with the result of the mix column stage. 
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• Implementation Result 
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The implementation of AES is an efficient 8-bit implementation based on using the 
"xtime" operation for mix columns [93]. The software implementation result for AES is 
shown in Table 4.1. In this implementation, the round keys are generated first and stored 
in the memory. 
Table 4.1. Implementation result of AES. 
Resource Utilization Code Data Total Used Size Use% 
(bytes) 1042 272 1314 131072 1.0% 
Encryption Timing 3266 cycles per block 
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2) Skipjack 
Skipjack [40] is designed to take the place ofthe Data Encryption Standards (DES) [9] 
and was first designed in 1987 and then declassified in 1998. It is utilized for WSNs in 
the TinySec scheme [63] due to its energy efficiency. However, some research has shown 
that Skipjack has security weakness under certain cryptanalyses [91 ][92]. Skipjack is a 
block cipher with 64-bit block size and 80-bit key size. It uses a Feistel structure and 
includes 32 rounds of operation. Within the 32 rounds, a data block is encrypted 
iteratively by rule A and rule B, which are slightly different in structure as shown in Fig. 
4.2. In this figure, B; and K; represent the ;lh plaintext byte and cipher key byte, 
respectively, and BH and BL represent the higher byte and lower byte, respectively. G is a 
permutation and F is a substitution using an 8x8 F-table (the same as an 8x8 S-box). 
I Plaintext I 
• ~ Rule A I 
+ 
I Rule B I 
32 
rounos < ... 
+ I Rule A I 
.. 
~ Rule B I 
+ I Ciphertext I 
Encryption structure G funciton 
Rule A 
Rule B 
Fig. 4.2. Skipjack encryption structure. 
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• Implementation Result 
The software implementation result for Skipjack is shown in Table 4.2. In this 
implementation, the round keys are generated first and stored in the memory. 
Table 4.2. Implementation result of Skipjack. 
Resource Utilization Code Data Used Size Use% 
(bytes) 2426 282 2708 131072 2.1% 
Encryption Timing 1482 cycles per block 
3) Puffin 
Puffin [51] is a recently proposed compact block cipher designed for hardware 
implementations. Puffin can resist differential and linear cryptanalysis and it is resistant 
to related-key attacks and weak keys, which are two main insecurities ofthe key schedule. 
Puffin is a block cipher of 64-bit block size and 128-bit key size. There are 33 rounds of 
operation and each round includes three stages: substitution, add round keys and 
permutation. The substitution uses a 4x4 S-box to make the circuit more compact and the 
permutation is operated bit by bit. The encryption structure of cipher Puffin is shown in 
Fig. 4.3. 
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• Implementation Result 
The software implementation result for Puffin is shown in Table 4.3. In this 
implementation, only the cipher's encryption is included and the round keys are 
initialized in the memory. 
Table 4.3. Implementation result of Puffin. 
Resource Utilization Code Data Used Size Use% 
(bytes) 802 520 1322 131072 1.0% 
Encryption Timing 43418 cycles per block 
4) BSPN 
Byte-wise SPN (BSPN) is a compact block cipher we recommend for use in WSNs 
[89] to provide moderate security to the energy-limited environment. It has no apparent 
weaknesses and is resistant to both the differential and linear cryptanalysis attacks [89]. 
The block size of BSPN is 64 bits and the key size is originally designed as 64 bits, but 
can be easily expanded to 128 bits. 
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The structure of BSPN encryption is illustrated in Fig. 4.4, which is similar to Puffin 
except that (I) there are 8 rounds of operation, (2) an 8x8 S-box is used, and (3) the linear 
transformation is based on 8-bit. In this figure, B; represents the ith byte of the data block. 
The structure of BSPN is especially efficient for 8-bit CPU operation. 
• Implementation Result 
The software implementation result for BSPN is shown in Table 4.4. In this 
implementation, the round keys are generated first and stored in the memory. 
Resource Utilization 
(bytes) 
Encryption Timing 
for i from 0 to 255 
S[i] := i 
end for 
j := 0 
fori from 0 to 255 
Table 4.4. Implementation result of BSPN. 
Code Data Used Size 
KSA 
514 336 850 131072 
796 cycles per block 
Table 4.5. RC4 algorithm description !59!. 
PRGA 
i := 0 
j := 0 
while GeneratingOutput: 
i := (i + I) mod 256 
j := (j + S[i]) mod 256 
swap(&S[i],&S(j]) 
Use% 
0.6% 
j := (j + S[i] + key(i mod keylength]) mod 256 
swap( &S[i],&S(j]) 
end for 
output S[(S[i] + S(j]) mod 256] 
endwhile 
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4.1.4 Implementation of Stream Ciphers 
1) RC4 
RC4 is a high throughput stream cipher, which is widely used in security protocols 
such as WEP (wired equivalent privacy) and SSL (secure sockets layer) [61]. The cipher 
RC4 includes two components: the key-scheduling algorithm (KSA) and the pseudo-
random generation algorithm (PRGA) [59]. The pseudo code is shown in Table 4.5. 
• Implementation Result 
The software implementation result for RC4 is shown in the table below: 
Table 4.6. Implementation result of RC4. 
Resource Utilization Code Data Used Size Use% 
(Bytes) 292 288 580 131072 0.4% 
Encryption Timing 
I 5890 cycles for keystream setup 
31 cycles per byte ofkeystream generated 
2) Other Stream Ciphers 
We also choose two other stream ciphers as candidates to compare, which are 
Sosemanuk [94] and Salsa [95]. We take the implementation results from [60], which are 
obtained by using the same platform. 
4.2 Factors Affecting the Computational Cost 
As we know, there are two fundamental categories of ciphers, symmetric key ciphers 
and asymmetric (or public) key ciphers, which use different ways to achieve security: 
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asymmetric cryptography depends on the difficulty of a mathematical problem and 
symmetric key cryptography focuses on the structure of iteratively applied simple 
cryptographic operations [61]. In WSNs, energy limitations make the security schemes 
focus on ciphers with efficient computational energy consumption. Hence, the symmetric 
key cipher is typically utilized to encrypt data during the transmission of sensor nodes. 
Before evaluating the energy consumption of different cryptographic algorithms in a 
WSN, we first discuss different factors that directly affect the computational energy cost. 
These factors can be divided into two types: (I) intrinsic nature of the algorithm structure 
and (2) extrinsic factor of channel quality, which influences the frequency of 
resynchronization. Both the intrinsic and extrinsic factors interactively affect the 
computational energy cost of cryptographic algorithms in a WSN. 
4.2.1 Intrinsic Factors 
1) Structure of the Cryptographic Algorithm 
Cryptographic algorithms or ciphers vary significantly in structure as we have seen in 
the previous section. Many block ciphers, such as AES [1 0], make use of a number of 
rounds of operations such as substitutions (S-boxes) and linear transformations. To 
satisfy certain special needs, such as low circuit area and limited resources, there are also 
some lightweight ciphers designed with some degrees of simplicity [88]. Lightweight 
ciphers are designed to provide just sufficient security, however, it may not offer as much 
as provided by AES [ 1 0]. For example, lightweight block ciphers may use smaller block 
size and key size than AES. For many applications in WSNs, a sensor node is an energy-
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limited device transmitting low entropy information with a limited life span. Hence, 
lightweight ciphers with energy efficiency can also be good candidates for such 
application environments. 
2) Size of Encryption Operands 
The size of encryption operands is different for stream ciphers and block ciphers. 
Stream ciphers typically operate on one bit of plaintext data to produce one ciphertext bit. 
This is typically achieved by XORing plaintext bits with a pseudorandom sequence of 
bits called the keystream to produce the ciphertext bits. For practicality, blocks of 
plaintext bits can often be XORed with keystream bits in parallel. In contrast, block 
ciphers process an entire block of plaintext bits (typically, 64 bits or 128 bits) at one time 
to produce a block of ciphertext bits. When encrypting a large sequence of plaintext bits, 
stream ciphers can straightforwardly operate on variable lengths. However, block ciphers 
may need to pad plaintext out to have a length that is a multiple of the block size. In 
WSNs, the extra ciphertext bits will result in increased transmission energy cost of the 
sensor node. 
3) Key Setup 
Usually there is a key setup period included in the operation of symmetric key ciphers. 
For example, AES has a key expansion phase to generate round keys from the cipher key. 
Although the detailed operation of key setup varies for different ciphers, it can be 
complicated and take a relatively long time to finish. In many applications in WSNs, key 
CHAPTER 4. SOFTWARE-ORIENTED ENERGY COST OF CRYPTOGRAPHlC ALGORITHMS 79 
setup is very infrequent since it will only follow the establishment of a new cipher key. 
Hence, this contribution of energy consumption is very small. 
4) Keystream I IV Setup 
Key stream setup or setup of the initialization vector (IV) takes place in symmetric key 
ciphers whenever a new IV is established. For example, stream ciphers must periodically 
re-initialize the keystream based on an updated IV to ensure that the transmitter and 
receiver are synchronized in their encryption and decryption processes, respectively. For 
block ciphers, all modes of operation [61], except ECB mode, use IVs, which are 
periodically updated to establish synchronization between encryption and decryption. 
When a block cipher is used in a stream cipher mode such as counter mode, the setup of 
the IV is equivalent to keystream setup. The energy cost of keystream setup for stream 
ciphers is typically much higher than that of block ciphers, and as we shall see, in a WSN, 
the energy cost of key stream setup is especially critical in the determination of whether to 
use a stream cipher or a block cipher. 
4.2.2 Extrinsic Factors 
In a noisy communication channel, bit errors may result in packets being lost or 
corrupted and the resulting decryption may lose synchronization with encryption. This 
can be resolved by periodic resynchronization involving the transfer of an initialization 
vector (IV). However, the energy cost of resynchronization will directly impact the 
lifetime of the sensor device and is influenced by the channel quality since poor quality 
channels result in the need to resynchronize frequently. In this section, we focus on 
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resynchronization computational energy cost for different ciphers, with the 
communication cost of resynchronization being explicitly investigated in Section 4. The 
computational cost of resynchronization will be different for block ciphers and stream 
ciphers due to their characteristics. 
1) Block Cipher Resynchronization 
When using block ciphers, the computational cost of encryption can be calculated 
directly by the number of data blocks times the energy cost per block. That is, fixed 
computational energy is consumed per data block encrypted. The computational energy 
cost of rv synchronization for a block cipher only includes a few CPU cycles to complete 
operations, such as loading and storing the new rv. The computational cost of key setup 
for block ciphers can be more substantial. However, we assume that key setup is very 
infrequent and base our analysis on the assumption that the round keys used by a block 
cipher are already generated and stored. 
2) Stream Cipher Resynchronization 
For stream ciphers, two phases are included in the operation of the cipher: (I) 
keystream setup based on an updated rv and (2) the keystream generation and encryption 
of plaintext. For most stream ciphers, the computational energy cost of IV 
synchronization (causing keystream setup) may take a considerable proportion of the 
total computational energy cost. This is particularly notable for RC4, which will be 
presented by our analysis later. 
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4.3 Evaluation Considering Intrinsic Factors 
Our evaluation of the cryptographic algorithms includes two parts: (1) consideration of 
intrinsic factors only, i.e., evaluating the symmetric key ciphers' energy performance 
directly; (2) consideration of extrinsic factors, which means applying the cipher to a 
protocol used in a noisy wireless channel. As a low cost device, a sensor node usually 
employs an 8-bit microcontroller to implement different kinds of operations. Hence, in 
our evaluation, we use the number of CPU cycles per byte to evaluate the computational 
energy efficiency of symmetric key ciphers. The number of cycles is obtained from an 
implementation ofthe cipher in assembly language on the ATmega128 CPU, a popular 8-
bit microcontroller, used in wireless sensor devices such as Mica2 [82]. 
4.3.1 Block Cipher Comparison 
We choose four block ciphers as candidates (which are presented in Section 4.1.3) to 
compare the different energy performance when applied in WSNs. 1n Table 4.7, we 
summarize the characteristics of these ciphers and their corresponding implementation 
results. 
Table 4. 7. Characteristics of block ciphers. 
Block cipher Block size Key size #Rounds Cycles per 
Cycles per 
block byte 
AES 128 bits 128 bits 10 3266 204 
Skipjack 64 bits 80 bits 32 1482 186 
Puffin 64 bits 128 bits 32 43418 5427 
BSPN 64 bits ~ 64 bits 8 796 99 
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From these results, we can see that BSPN requires the fewest number of CPU cycles 
per byte among the four block ciphers and thus has the lowest computational energy cost. 
The relationship between the CPU cycles and the size of plaintext is illustrated in Fig. 4.5. 
The total number of cycles to encrypt is based on operating the cipher in ECB mode. 
However, results for other modes, such as CBC mode or counter mode would be very 
similar. In this figure, BSPN achieves the best energy efficiency for all plaintext sizes. 
The number of CPU cycles of Puffin is noticeably higher than that of others because it is 
designed for hardware purposes. AES achieves a better result than Puffin, while slightly 
worse than the other two ciphers. Note that, although the performance of Skipjack is 
slightly better than AES, it is vulnerable to cryptanalysis. Notice that the curves show a 
staircase shape with fixed period, which is caused by the block size of the cipher. 
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Fig. 4.5. Comparison of computational costs for block ciphers. 
Since the cipher is implemented in software (i.e., in assembly language), the number 
of CPU cycles is directly related to the architecture ofthe block cipher and instruction set 
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of the CPU. The characteristics of the block cipher' s substitution and linear 
transformation are two critical factors affecting the number of CPU cycles. These 
characteristics are summarized in Table 4.8. The "Linear Trans. Unit" refers to the basic 
unit manipulated by the linear transformation. BSPN achieves the best energy 
performance among the four ciphers because of its efficiency of substitution and linear 
transformation for an 8 bit CPU. 
Puffin, as block cipher aimed for compactness, was designed for hardware purposes 
making it not efficient for software implementation. BSPN' s use ofthe 8x8 S-box makes 
the substitution value look-up convenient in an 8 bit CPU. In contrast, a 4 x4 S-box used 
in Puffin requires two memory accesses to update one byte of data during the substitution. 
Although in Puffin, we can reconstruct the S-box to make it appropriate for the byte 
operation, extra memory needs to be allocated. BSPN performs a linear transformation on 
the data by XORing the output bytes of otherS-boxes directly, which greatly reduces the 
complexity on an 8 bit CPU compared to the cipher Puffin, whose linear transformation 
is structured on a bitwise basis. Although part of the linear transformation can be 
optimized, it cannot change the result of taking a large number of cycles to execute. 
Table 4.8. Characteristics of substitution and permutation. 
Block cipher Structure S-box Linear Trans. Unit 
BSPN SPN 8x8 8 bits 
Skipjack Feistel 8x8 8 bits 
AES SPN 8x8 8 bits 
Puffin SPN 4x4 I bit 
------· ---------------- ------------
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As shown in the table, both AES and BSPN have the 8x8 S-box and byte oriented 
linear transformation. The reason that AES costs 105 cycles more than BSPN per byte is 
the algorithm complexity of AES. It should be noted, however, that AES is designed for a 
128-bit level of security for both key and block size, while for BSPN, it is designed for a 
64-bit level of security both in key and block size. 
4.3.2 Stream Cipher Comparison 
We have selected three stream ciphers to compare, which are RC4 [61] (which is 
implemented in Section 4.1.4), Sosemanuk [94] and Salsa [95]. RC4 is a popular stream 
cipher generating a small size (8 bit) keystream block to XOR with 8 bits of plaintext, 
and Sosemanuk and Salsa are from the eSTREAM project (Profile 1), which are 
considered secure and designed for software purposes. Although there are also two other 
stream ciphers in the Profile I, Rabbit and HC-128, we do not consider them for the same 
reasons explained in [60]: Rabbit is patented and HC-128 is too complicated to be 
implemented efficiently on an 8-bit CPU. Table 4.9 shows the characteristics and 
implementation results of the three stream ciphers, where the implementation results of 
Sosemanuk and Salsa are taken from [60], which uses the same platform as our 
implementation. 
Table 4.9. Implementation results of different stream ciphers. 
Stream cipher Keystream block 
CPU cycles Cycles per byte 
size Setup Encrypt (encrypt) 
RC4 8 bits 18787 31 31 
Sosemanuk 640 bits 8739 8559 107 
Salsa 512 bits 60 17812 279 
CHAPTER 4. SOFTWARE-ORlENTED ENERGY COST OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS 85 
From the implementation result, we can see that if we do not consider the keystream 
setup period, RC4 uses the fewest number of cycles to generate the keystream bytes for 
encryption. However, the energy efficiency of the stream ciphers is significantly 
influenced by the keystream setup period. The relation between the number of CPU 
cycles and the size of the plaintext is illustrated in Fig. 4.6, which is obtained on the 
assumption that the keystream setup period only happens once at the beginning of 
communication and then the keystream is generated continuously. In this figure, it can be 
seen that when the size of plaintext is smaller than 81 bytes, RC4 has the worst 
performance because of the larger number of setup cycles. However, after that point, RC4 
achieves the best energy performance since dramatically fewer cycles are needed to 
generate the keystream bytes for encryption . 
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4.4 Evaluation Considering Extrinsic Factors 
Now we evaluate the energy performance of the block ciphers and stream ciphers in a 
noisy environment. We apply the counter mode of operation to the block cipher to ensure 
that it functions similarly to a stream cipher. This results in a fair comparison between 
stream ciphers and block ciphers and it is a suitable mode for WSN applications [62]. By 
using stream ciphers and block ciphers, we analyze the amount of valid data transmitted 
per Joule, i.e., the energy efficiency. The analysis is based on the Mica sensor node, 
which is briefly introduced in Chapter 3. The Periodic IV without ACK scheme (whose 
details will be discussed in Chapter 6) is used for the IV distribution, which functions by 
transmitting IV within an independent packet periodically to resynchronize the cipher. In 
the analysis, bit errors are generated randomly and independently. Fig. 4.7 shows the 
performance comparison result of different ciphers," which is obtained under the bit error 
rate (BER) of I 04 and with the number of data packets between each IV packet being K = 
5. Other details of the analysis can be found in the following sections, such as the 
parameters listed in Table 6.3 and packet format illustrated in Fig. 6.3. For generating the 
MAC used in each data packet, we assume that for each block cipher case, the block 
cipher is used in CBC mode [61] to generate the MAC [61]. For the stream cipher cases, 
the MAC is generated by AES used in CBC mode. 
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Fig. 4.7. Energy performance of different ciphers (K=S, BER = 10"4). 
Analysis results show that the BSPN cipher achieves the best energy performance, and 
in general, a sensor node can transmit more valid data bits using block ciphers. It is worth 
noting that, noisy channels result in the need for frequent resynchronization. Although for 
RC4, the number of cycles per byte for encryption is the fewest, it shows the worst 
energy performance under a noisy channel due to its large number of keystream setup 
cycles. 
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we have investigated the energy performance of symmetric key 
cryptographic algorithms when security is applied to the link layer of wireless sensor 
networks. We evaluate the energy efficiency by comparing the number of CPU cycles per 
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byte for different symmetric key ciphers, including both stream ciphers and block ciphers. 
We further analyze the ciphers according to their characteristics and the effect of the 
channel quality when applied in WSNs. Finally, we conclude from the analysis results 
that the lightweight block cipher, BSPN, achieves good performance, providing energy 
efficiency as well as suitable security for sensor nodes in a WSN. 
Chapter 5 
HARDWARE-ORIENTED ENERGY COST OF 
CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS 
This chapter presents the investigation of the energy cost for cryptographic algorithms 
with hardware implementation in WSNs. There is a recent trend to provide a 
reconfigurable hardware environment compared to the traditional architecture of wireless 
sensor nodes. This kind of sensor network is designed to cater to special requirements, 
such as speed acceleration, on-line debugging and remote reconfiguration. A 
reconfigurable sensor node typically includes reconfigurable hardware, such as a field-
programmable gate array (FPGA), to provide more flexible functionality and much 
higher performance. The cryptographic algorithm, as a time consuming operation in 
WSNs, can be processed by the configurable hardware. 
In this chapter, we especially investigate the hardware implementation of involutional 
block ciphers since the characteristics of involution enables performing encryption and 
decryption using the same circuit. This characteristic is particularly appropriate for a 
wireless sensor node, which requires the function of both encryption and decryption. We 
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choose two involutional block ciphers: KHAZAD [98] and BSPN [89]; and focus on 
analyzing their energy efficiency by implementing using different methods. Since both 
these two ciphers are designed with an SPN structure, we further explore the ciphers' 
energy cost of different components, such as key scheduling, data path operation and 
linear transformation. We also implement these two ciphers by assembly language to 
obtain the energy cost of using software and we evaluate the energy performance for 
software and hardware cooperation using software for round key scheduling and using 
hardware for data encryption and decryption. 
5.1 Reconfigurable WSNs 
A reconfigurable WSN is a kind of sensor network, which incorporates a 
reconfigurable hardware into a sensor node. The structure of traditional sensor node and 
reconfigurable sensor node is shown in Fig. 5.1. Here, a traditional sensor node is 
referred to as the type of sensor node with a low cost general-purpose microcontroller 
(such as 8-bit Atmel A VR series) to control everything in the sensor node. As we know, a 
microcontroller functions by executing instructions serially and the efficiency of 
operation will be much affected when there is a lot of work to deal with at the same time, 
such as controlling the communication traffic, managing different sensors, processing 
different kinds of data, maintaining the system performance, etc.. Compared to a 
traditional sensor node, a reconfigurable sensor node works more efficiently with the help 
of a reconfigurable hardware. The detailed division of tasks for software and hardware 
--------- --- ----------------------------------
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depends on the specific requirements of the application environment. Usually, the 
hardware is in charge of the complicated and time-consuming data processing. 
Memory 
(a) traditional sensor node 
~ Microcontroller 
· · ~---.. 
i (Sensor 1) 
; (Sensor 2) 
1 .... ~~-~-~~~r-~~ ...... 
(Sensor 1) 
(Sensor 2) 
(Sensor N) 
(b) reconfigurable sensor node 
Fig. 5. I. Traditional sensor node vs. reconfigurable sensor node. 
In recent years, several researchers have focused on implementing and analyzing a 
reconfigurable WSN. Some research uses a commercial FPGA functioning as the 
reconfigurable hardware, such as Altera series used in [99] [I 00], Xilinx series used in 
[101] [102], and Actel series used in [103]. Some research uses specific reconfigurable 
integrated circuits to achieve the hardware acceleration [104][105]. A typical commercial 
sensor node with reconfigurability is Cookie, which is designed by a modular architecture 
and use a FPGA ofXilinx Spartan 3 [106]. 
However, it is an inevitable issue that a FPGA in WSNs might introduce more energy 
cost while providing the higher performance and more flexibility. In addition, as we 
know, an FPGA is not a device especially designed for low power consumption. 
Fortunately, the development of microelectronic technology is trying to mitigate the 
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disadvantage by designing ultra low power FPGA to fill the shortage, such as FPGA from 
Actel IGLOO series [107], which consumes power as low as 2f..I.W in the best case. 
5.2 Utilizing Involutional Block Cipher in WSNs 
In this section, we focus on investigating two involutional block ciphers: KHAZAD 
and BSPN. We will discuss their commonality and detailed difference from the point of 
view of structure. 
We call a function F(x) involutional when it is its own inverse, which means the 
following expression is satisfied: 
. x = F(F(x) ). (5.1) 
An involution block cipher means a block cipher with an involutional characteristic as 
shown in Fig. 5.2. A block cipher encrypts the plaintext P to generate the ciphertext C, 
and the exactly same algorithm can be used to generate the plaintext back. The 
characteristics of involution may be specifically appropriate for a specific type of sensor 
nodes, which requires the ability of both encryption and decryption. For hardware 
implementations, the same circuit can provide both encryption and decryption. As the 
sensor node is a resource-limited device, involutional block ciphers can nicely satisfy this 
purpose. 
Key: K 
Plaintext: P Ciphertext: C 
Involutional 
Block Cipher 
Ciphertext: C Plaintext: P 
Fig. 5.2. Involutional block cipher. 
CHAPTER 5. HARDWARE-ORIENTED ENERGY COST OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC A LGORITHMS 93 
5.2.1 Common Features of an Involutional SPN cipher 
1) SPN Cipher Structure 
Both KHAZAD and BSPN adopt an SPN structure which is illustrated in Fig. 5.3, 
including three basic components: substitution, permutation (linear transformation), and 
add round keys. They both have eight rounds of operation, an 8x 8 S-box and a 64-bit 
block size. Notice that, the decryption step is in the reverse order of the encryption step. 
In the encryption process, the "Add Round Key" component is before the component 
"Linear Transformation"; while in the decryption process, the "Linear Transformation" 
component goes first. In addition, the round keys used in encryption process should be 
applied in a reverse order. 
Encryption 
7 
rounds 
KO 
K1-K8 
K9 
Decryption 
7 
rounds 
Fig. 5.3. Structure of SPN. 
2) Involutional SPN Cipher Structure 
Fig. 5.4 shows how involutional SPN cipher works: 
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• All these three components need to be involutional, which means an involutional 
S-box and an involutional linear transformation. (The "Add Round Key" 
operation is originally involutional due to the XOR operation.) 
• The operation sequence of the component should be the same for both encryption 
and decryption. For this purpose, the round keys used in the encryption process 
need to be first operated through the transformation component, then applied in a 
reverse order. 
Encryption Decryption 
r--------------------------. 
Involutional Linear Trans. 
K9 
Involutional Linear Trans. 
K8*-K1* Involutional Linear Trans. 
KO 
Involutional Linear Trans. 
(a) Involutional SPN structure (b) Round key for involutional SPN structure 
Fig. 5.4. Structure of involutional SPN. 
3) Round Key Expansion 
Both KHAZAD and BSPN have eight rounds of operation, with no linear 
transformation involved in the last round. The nine round keys involved in the "Add 
Round Key" operation are generated based on a cipher key and a process called round 
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key expansion or key scheduling. Both the round key expansion process of cipher 
KHAZAD and BSPN are based on the concept of SPN. 
5.2.2 Ciphers: KHAZAD and BSPN 
In this section, the details of cipher KHAZAD and BSPN will be discussed since the 
structural complexity of the cipher will affect the energy cost in a sensor node. The 
detailed structures of the two ciphers are shown in Fig. 5.5, including the substitution, 
linear transformation and add round keys. 
1 
byte 
7 
rounds ( 
01 03 04 OS 06 08 08 07) 
03 01 OS 04 08 06 07 08 
04 OS OJ 03 08 07 06 08 
x OS 04 03 01 07 08 08 06 
06 08 08 07 0 I 03 04 OS 
08 06 07 08 03 01 OS 04 
08 07 06 08 04 OS 01 03 
07 08 08 06 OS 04 03 01 
MDS matrix 
(a) Structure of KHAZAD 
1 
byte 
7 
rounds 
(b) Structure of BSPN 
Fig. 5.5. Structures of KHAZAD and BSPN. 
1) Substitution: KHAZAD vs. BSPN 
• KHAZAD 
The involutional S-box of KHAZAD was initially designed by pseudo-random S-box 
generation. An appropriate S-box is chosen among these random S-boxes, which satisfies 
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involutional functionality and other security requirements. However, it is pointed out that 
the pseudo-randomly generated S-box may be not efficient for hardware implementation 
under some conditions. For this purpose, the designers further proposed an alternative S-
box, which is based on the structure of involutional permutation. The structure of the 
KHAZAD S-box is shown in Fig. 5.6, where P and Q are pseudo-randomly generated 
involutional mini-boxes, and the mini-box relation between input and output is shown. 
The final involutional S-box is shown Appendix A. I. 
Mini-box 
u P[u] Q(u] 
0 3 9 
1 F E 
2 E 5 
3 0 6 
4 5 A 
5 4 2 
6 B 3 
7 c c 
8 D F 
9 A 0 
A 9 4 
B 6 D 
c 7 7 
D 8 B 
E 2 1 
F 1 8 
Fig. 5.6. Structure of KHAZAD S-box. 
• BSPN 
There is no specific S-box provided in the cipher BSPN specification [89]. Hence, we 
have designed an involutional S-box based on the idea of AES' s encryptionS-box. The 
structure of the BSPN S-box is shown in Fig. 5.7. We use AES 's multiplicative inverse 
part, which is in Galois field GF(28) based on the irreducible polynomial 
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m(x) = x 8 + x 4 + x 3 + x + 1 (5.2) 
due to its good cryptographic properties [10]. To make the S-box involutional, we use the 
affine transformation twice, which XORs the other 7 bits of the input but not the operated 
bit itself. We implement the S-box structure in C language, and obtain the substitution 
lookup table as shown in Appendix A.2. Although there are two fixed points (which is 
OxOO and OxFE), there is no proof that the fixed points can lead to an attack on the cipher. 
Affine transformation 
Multirlicative inverse 
(x +x4+x3+x+1) 
Affine transformation 
Fig. 5.7. The BSPN involutional S-box generation. 
2) Linear Transformation: KHAZAD vs. BSPN 
• Cipher KHAZAD 
The linear transformation layer is based on an involutional MDS code, which is 
selected by exhaustive search. To achieve efficient implementation for both software and 
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hardware, the final decision is made by two factors: the lowest possible hamming weight 
and the lowest possible integer values. The linear transformation is expressed as 
(bo bl bz b3 b4 bs b6 b7) = 
01 03 04 OS 06 08 OB 07 
03 01 OS 04 08 06 07 OB 
04 OS 01 03 OB 07 06 08 
(ao at az a3 a4 as a6 a7) x OS 04 03 01 07 OB 08 06 06 08 OB 07 01 03 04 OS 
08 06 07 OB 03 01 OS 04 
OB 07 06 08 04 OS 01 03 
07 OB 08 06 OS 04 03 01 
(5.3) 
where ao ... 7 and bo ... 7 represent input and output byte respectively, and the reduction 
polynomial in Galois field GF(28) is 
m(x) = x8 +x4 +x3 +x2 + 1. (5.4) 
• Cipher BSPN 
In cipher BSPN, the result of the linear transformation, U, is achieved by bitwise 
XORing the output bytes, V;, of the other seven S-boxes after adding the round key, i.e., 
for byte i , 
(5.5) 
Compared to cipher KHAZAD, cipher BSPN has a much simpler linear 
transformation function. However, it achieves better energy efficiency and is more 
suitable for the application of energy-limited environment, which will be shown in the 
next section. 
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3) Round Key Generation: KHAZAD vs. BSPN 
• Cipher KHAZAD 
The round key expansion of cipher KHAZAD is shown in Fig. 5.8. During the key 
expansion period, the 128-bit cipher key is expanded into nine 64-bit round keys, K, 
0:Sr:S8 where r represents the round number. For the round 0, K 1 and K 2 is initialized by 
the cipher key, i.e., K 2 and K 1 take the first 8 bytes and the last 8 bytes of the cipher key, 
respectively. 
64 bits 
Add Round 
Constant 
64 bits 
(a) Round key expansion (b) Round constant generation 
Fig. 5.8. KHAZAD key expansion. 
• Cipher BSPN: 
The round keys of BSPN are generated directly by using BSPN cipher itself to encrypt 
any arbitrary value except 0. That is to say, each round key is generated by eight rounds 
of operation. The round keys used for key expansion depend on the key size of the cipher 
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BSPN. As shown in Fig. 5.9, if the cipher key size is 64 bits, the cipher key will used 
directly in each round key; while ifthe cipher key size is 128 bits, the first 8 bytes and the 
last 8 bytes of the cipher key will be used alternatively. Compared to the key expansion 
of cipher KHAZAD, BSPN has a more complicated key expansion algorithm. However, 
in a WSN, the cipher key will not be changed very frequently, which means the energy 
cost of the key expansion process will not significantly affect the total energy 
performance. 
Key size 64 bits Add round key Key size 128 bits 
CiphE!r key [63:0J 14 1st round ~ I Cipher key [127:64J 
Cipher key (63:0J 14 2nd round ~ I Cipher key [ 63 : OJ 
Cipher key [63:0J 14 3rn round ~I Cipher key [127:64J 
Cipher key [63:0J 14 4th round ~ I Cipher key [ 63 : OJ 
Cipher key [63:0J 14 5th round ~I Cipher key [127:64J 
Cipher key [63:0J 14 6th round ~I Cipher key [ 63 : OJ 
Cipher key [63:0J 14 y!h round ~ I Cipher key [127:64J 
Cipher key [63:0J 14 8th round ~I Cipher key [ 63 : OJ 
Cipher key [63:0J 14 gth round ~I Cipher key [127:64J 
Fig. 5.9. BSPN round key used for key size of 128 bits and 64 bits. 
5.3 Hardware Implementation 
5.3.1 Design Objective 
In this section, we focus on the hardware implementation of cipher KHAZAD and 
BSPN considering the application environment of WSNs. The hardware is implemented 
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by Verilog HDL code with FPGA as the technology target. Since in WSNs, a sensor node 
is energy limited device, low power is the major consideration of the design. In addition, 
as a life limited device, key establishment will not be done very frequently. Unlike many 
cipher hardware implementations, which generate the round keys on the fly to save the 
area necessary to store round keys, we divide the design into two relatively independent 
parts: (I) the process of key scheduling and (2) the process of data en/decryption. In our 
design, the key expansion is onJy processed during the initial setup period or when a new 
cipher key is updated. The generated round keys will be stored for future use in the 
resources available on the FPGA. As we mentioned, in a sensor node, most activity of the 
circuit is encrypting or decrypting data, which will be much more power efficient since 
no key scheduling activity is involved in the circuit. 
5.3.2 Interfaces and Requirements 
In our design, both cipher KHAZAD and BSPN use the same interfaces and timing 
requirements such that it is convenient to understand and compare these two designs. The 
block diagram is shown in Fig. 5. 10 with the description of input and output interfaces 
illustrated in Table 5.1 . The timing requirements of the interfaces are shown in Fig. 5.11. 
elk 
rst n 
- ... 
key flag oo done 
data flag 
-... Cipher data out [63:0] 
-... 
mode 
data in [63:0] 
... 
Fig. 5.1 0. Interface of the cipher. 
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Table 5.1. Interface description. 
Port Name Bits Description 
elk I Clock of the design, rising edge sensitive 
Reset signal of the design, which is asynchronous low level 
rst n I 
sensitive. 
key_flag I 
Rising edge sensitive signal indicating the key expansion process 
begins and there comes a new cipher key. 
data_flag 
Rising edge sensitive signal indicating data operation process begins 
and there comes a 64-bit size data to be encrypted or decrypted. 
input 
When mode = 0, it indicates an encryption process; When mode = I, 
mode it indicates a decryption process. It should be ready before the 
data_flag's rising edge. 
(I) Used as data: When mode=O, data_in is the plaintext; when 
mode=!, data_ in is the ciphertext. It should be ready before the 
data_flag's rising edge. (2) Used as key: If the key size is 64 bits, it 
data in 64 should be ready before key_ flag's rising edge. If the key size is 128 
bits, the first 8 bytes of the key should be ready before the rising 
edge of key_ flag, and the last eight bytes of the key should be ready 
within 2 cycles after the rising edge of key _flag. 
Level sensitive signal indicating the operation is finished. It means 
op_done I 
that the key expansion finished corresponding to the rising edge of 
key_flag; and means en/decryption finished corresponding to the 
output 
rising edge of data_tlag. 
data out 64 
When mode=O, data_ out is the plaintext; when mode= I, data_ out is 
the ciphertext. The data is valid after the rising edge ofop_done. 
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rst_n 
elk _____nlnj-u- ··· _j-u-~ 
j ; l . 
key_flag 
data_flag 
mode 
data_in[63:0] 
(64 bit key) 
data_in[63:0] 
(128 bit key) 
op_done 
data_out[63:0] 
J key (63:0] I ! Pl~intext[63 : 0] 
I key[12l 64) key[63:0) I j Pl~intext[63 : 0] 
ciphertext[63f0] 
Fig. 5.11. Timing requirements of the interface signals. 
5.3.3 Implementation Details 
1) Substitution 
decryption 
l encryption 
! ciphertext I 
The implementation of an 8x8 S-box for an FPGA target can be achieved in two ways: 
(I) using a lookup table (LUT) to implement the Boolean function directly which is 
constructed by combinational logic and (2) using the configurable block RAM core 
which is embedded in FPGA device. The first method can achieve low time delay, while 
the second method can fully utilize the resources provided by the device. Furthermore, 
since both KHAZAD and BSPN have a 64-bit block size, the whole substitution layer can 
also be designed for different purposes: (I) using only one S-box circuit for minimizing 
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area or (2) using eight S-box circuits in parallel for increasing speed. [n our design, to 
find a good solution for energy efficiency, we have tried different combinations. 
• LUT vs. BRAM 
Using LUTs (combinational logic) to implement the S-box is a quite straightforward 
way. The FPGA synthesis tool will generate the 8-bit output logic circuit according to the 
8-bit input. However, the detailed result will be different depending on the mapping of 
the S-box. 
BRAM needs to be configured and generated before use, and the memory size should 
not override the maximum size provided by the FPGA device. According to the needs of 
the design, we generate a single port synchronous read only memory with size 256 and 
depth 8. 
The interface of the S-box circuit is shown in Fig. 5 .12. It is worth noting that for the 
LUT design, the output will be valid with a short delay after the input is given, while for 
the BRAM design, the output will not be valid until the next clock rising edge because of 
the synchronous structure. Furthermore, the timing delay of the LUT design will be less 
than that ofthe BRAM design, since many factors affect the timing delay ofBRAM such 
as the floor plan ofthe chip and specific technology being used. 
din[7:0] dout[7:0] elk 
addr[7:0] 
(a) LUT interface 
Fig. 5.12. Interfaces of S-box. 
BRAM 
256x8 bit 
(b) BRAM interface 
data [7:0] 
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• Small Area vs. High Speed 
For the purpose of small area, only one S-box circuit is used in the design, which 
serially generates the output value byte by byte. The design needs eight clock cycles all 
together to finish one round of 64-bit data substitution. We use a 3-bit counter and a 
demux to in which register to store the S-box output value. The circuit structure is shown 
in Fig. 5.13. 
8x8 S-box 
----
8 bits circuit 
Fig. 5.13. Substitution implementation using oneS-box unit. 
For the purpose of high speed, eight S-box circuits are used in the design, which 
simultaneously generates the full 64-bit output in one clock cycle. The circuit structure is 
shown in Fig. 5.14. 
Notice that both the speed and area will affect the energy efficiency in a sensor node. 
Processing the data for a long time or using a large number of transistors will both lead to 
large energy cost. The low power design is a balance between these two factors. 
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8x8 S-box 
circuit 8 bits 
8x8 S-box 
8 bits circuit 8 bits 
8 
8x8 S-box 
8 bits circuit 
Fig. 5.14 Substitution implementation using eightS-box units 
2) Linear Transformation 
• KHAZAD 
We implement the KHAZAD linear transformation by using combinational logic. To 
make the circuit work more efficiently, we need to do some transformation first to avoid 
using a complicated multiplier circuit for the matrix. The steps of the transformation are 
described as following: 
Step 1: Expand the result of linear transformation by definition: 
(bo bi bz b3 b4 bs b6 b7) = 
01 03 04 OS 06 08 OB 07 
03 01 OS 04 08 06 07 OB 
04 OS 01 03 OB 07 06 08 
(ao at az a3 a4 as a6 a7) x OS 04 03 01 07 OB 08 06 06 08 OB 07 01 03 04 OS 
08 06 07 OB 03 01 OS 04 
OB 07 06 08 04 OS 01 03 
07 OB 08 06 OS 04 03 01 
Then we get the output results to be expressed as 
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Step 2: Using the following polynomial into the expressions: 
1 = (x 0 ), 
6 = (x 2 + x), 
3 = (x + 1), 
7 = (x 2 + x + 1), 
4 = (x 2 + 1), 
8 = (x 3 ) , 
reorganize the expression and we get the final result 
5 = (x 2 + 1), 
B = (x3 +X + 1), 
bo = (ao<:Da1<:Da3(Da6 (Da7)(D(a1 <:Da4(Da6 EDa7)x(D(az (Da3(Da4 EDa6)x2(D(as EDa6)x3 
b1 = (aoEDa1EDazEDa6 <:Da7)(D(ao <:Das<:Da6 <:Da7)x(D(az (Da3<:Das EDa6)x2EDCa4 (Da7)x3 
bz = (al <:Daz<:Da3 (Da4 EDas)E9(a3 EDa4EDas <:Da6)x(D(ao<:Da1 EDas EDa6)x2EDCa4 <:Da7 )x3 
b3 = (aoEDazEDa3 (Da4 EDas)ED(az EDa4EDas (Da7 )x(D(ao<:Da1 <:Da4 <:Da7 )x2ED(as EDa6)x3 
b4 = (az<:Da3(Da4 EDas <:Da7)(D~ao <:Daz<:Da3 EDas)x(D(aoEDa3EDa6 EDa7)x2EDCa1 EDaz)x3 
bs = (az<:Da3(Da4 EDas EDa6)(D(a1 <:Daz<:Da3 (Da4)x(D(a1 EDazEDa6 (Da7 )x2(D(ao (Da3)x3 
b6 = (ao<:Da1 ED as <:Da6 (Da7 )(D(ao EDa1 EDaz (Da7 )x(D(a1 EDaz<:Da4 EDas)x2EDCao (Da3)x3 
b1 = (ao<:Da1 (Da4 EDa6 (Da7 )(D(ao <:Da1 <:Da3 EDa6)x(D(aoEDa3EDa4 EDas)x2EDCal <:Daz)x3 
Step 3: We can see that four major components are involved in the design: x0 (can be 
viewed as 1 and is not shown in the expression of b;), x, x2, and x3• The irreducible 
polynomial is m(x) = x8+x4+x3+x2+ 1, hence, the x, x2, x3 circuits can be constructed by the 
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combinational logic which are shown in Fig. 5.15. In this figure, each variable w; andy; is 
a bit. The input for w; is the left expression of x; (i= 1 ,2,3) in step 2, such as for expression 
(a0 (f)a1 (f)a3 (f)a6 )x, the XOR result of (a0 (f)a1 (f)a3 (f)a6 ) is connected tow;. 
I~ I~ I'--' 1'--------' 
We 
r"'" 
x circuit >? circuit 
I~ I~ 
I~ I~ I~ 
1 
I'-' 1'---' 1'--------' r"' 
I~ I'-' '---' I'-- rr 
x3 circuit 
Fig. 5.15x,~and x3 circuit ofKHAZAD 
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Step 4: XOR all the results, y;, of circuit I, x, x2, and x3 together. 
• BSPN 
Compared to cipher KHAZAD, the implementation of BSPN is much simpler and 
straightforward. It can be implemented by the combinational logic following its linear 
transformation definition. 
3) SPN Core Circuit Sharing 
Three basic components "substitution", " linear transformation" and "add round key" 
constitute the core circuit of the SPN. The implementation details of "substitution" and 
"linear transformation" are discussed in the previous two sections, and "add round key" 
can be directly implemented by XOR logic. Now we consider using the SPN core to 
construct the cipher. 
As we discussed before, to achieve better power efficiency, the key expansion process 
and data en/decryption processes are regarded as two individual processes. To save the 
circuit area further, we make use of the fact that these two processes will not happen at 
the same time. Hence, the SPN core is designed for use by both the key expansion and 
the data en/decryption. The block diagram is illustrated in Fig. 5.16. In this figure, we can 
see that the design is based on the reuse of the SPN core. A process indicator is generated 
from the input key_ flag and data_ flag to indicate which process is currently being 
operated. A counter is used to calculate the operation rounds, and its maximum value is 
decided by the specific cipher and process. Multiplexers are used to apply data to the 
corresponding process. 
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64 bits 
64 bits 
.-- --------- - -.--- process indicator 
plaintext I ciphertext 
constants for round 
64 bits key generation 
round key 
64 bits 
64 bits 
64 bits 
cipher key 
64 bits.-- ___, 14--.,...,._-1 data_in I 
~-- max round count 
~-- max key round 
L__ _ process indicator 
64 bits 
14--..-<----- encryption round key 
64 bits . ~..-<----- decryption round key 
mode 
used for round 
key generation 
finish 
condition 
process indicator ~--~ --1 data_flag I 
pulse 
generator 
process 
condition 
64 bits 
Fig. 5.16. SPN core. 
key_flag 
op_done 
data_out I 
5.4 Implementation Results 
We choose Xilinx Spartan 3 series, xc3s200 with package 208, as the target device of 
implementation, which is a low end, low power FPGA. The working voltage of the 
device xc3s200 is 1.2v, and its available resources are listed Table 5.2. We use EDA tool 
ModelSim for simulation and Xilinx ISE for synthesis. 
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Table 5.2. Available resource of xc3s200. 
Type Available Resources 
Number of slice flip flops 3840 
Number of 4 input LUT 3840 
Number of bounded JOBs 141 
Number of block RAMs 12 
Both cipher KHAZAD and BSPN are implemented in four methods, which represent 
different considerations as we discussed in previous sections. The four methods are: 
• Using I S-box LUT circuit 
• Using 8 S-box LUT circuit 
• Using I S-box BRAM circuit 
• Using 8 S-box BRAM circuit 
By implementing the block ciphers with different methods, we focus on exploring the 
energy efficiency of hardware implementation, which is affected by both the circuit area 
and the total operation time. We also compare the energy performance between cipher 
KHAZAD and cipher BSPN at different levels: (1) full hardware including key 
scheduling and data operation, (2) only data operation, and (3) different structures of 
linear transformation. 
5.4.1 LUT Method vs. BRAM Method 
We first investigate the effects of different methods applied to a design, including 
using LUT and BRAM, as well as the number of S-boxes being involved. Here, we use 
labels BSPN-64 and BSPN-128 to represent the cipher BSPN with key size 64 bits and 
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128 bits, respectively. We implement BSPN-64 by four methods, and the implementation 
results are shown in Table 5.3. From these results, we can see that when using the same 
number of S-box circuits, the S-box constructed by LUT or BRAM is a dominant factor 
for the total equivalent gate count for design. This is because the equivalent gate count of 
BRAM is greatly larger than the same function using LUT. However, it makes use of the 
FPGA resources more efficiently. Compared to using LUT, the number of occupied slices 
is much smaller with the use of BRAM, which allows the use of FPGA slices for 
implementing other functions. Furthermore, designs using eight S-box circuits introduce 
more FPGA resources than using only one S-box. However, using eight S-boxes to finish 
processing subsHtution in one clock cycle will greatly decrease the total time needed for 
data encryption and decryption. 
Table 5.3. Implementation result of 64-bit key BSPN. 
Used resources Utilization of Resources 
Method Resources 
1 S-box 8 S-box 1 S-box 8 S-box 
# slice flip flop 72I 653 I8% I7% 
# 4 input LUT 2,0I2 2,757 52% 7I% 
LUT #occupied slice 1,350 1,678 70% 
87% 
#BRAM 0 0 0 0 
Total equivalent gate 
19,782 26,231 --
count for design 
#slice flip flop 722 589 18% I5% 
# 4 inputLUT I,884 I,675 49% 43% 
BRAM 
# occupied slice I,29I I, I41 67% 59% 
#BRAM I 8 8% 66% 
Total equivalent gate 
84,198 540,635 - -
count for design 
-------------------------- ---------
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5.4.2 KHAZAD vs. BSPN 
In this part, we focus on comparing the hardware implementation of cipher KHAZAD 
and BSPN-128 with both ofthem using a 128-bit key. 
1) Full Cipher Implementation 
We implement cipher KHAZAD and BSPN-128 with full cipher functionality, 
including key scheduling, data encryption and data decryption. In the implementation, 
BRAM is used to construct the S-box, such that the FPGA resources can be efficiently 
utilized. The implementation results are shown in Table 5.4. In this table, we can see that 
cipher KHZAD used more resources than BSPN_128 for both the " 1 S-box" method and 
the "8 S-box" method. 
Table 5.4. Implementation results full ciphers using BRAM: KHAZAD vs. BSPN. 
Used resources Utilization of Resources 
Method Resources 
KHAZAD BSPN KHAZAD BSPN 
# slice flip flop 779 780 20% 20% 
I # 4 input LUT 2602 2183 67% 56% 
BRAM # occupied slice 1686 1443 87% 75% 
S-box #BRAM 1 1 8% 8% 
Total equivalent gate 
89,690 87,214 - -
count for design 
#slice flip flop 655 654 17% 17% 
8 
# 4 input LUT 2694 1907 70% 49% 
BRAM 
# occupied slice 1728 1258 90% 65% 
S-box #BRAM 8 8 66% 66% 
Total equivalent gate 
547,207 543,056 
count for design - -
~-~~------
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We have also implemented these two ciphers using the "8 S-box LUT" method, and 
the results show the same trend. As shown in the shaded cell of Table 5.5, the resource 
utilization for cipher KHAZAD achieves II 0%, which means our target device xc3s200 
cannot even offer enough space. 
Table 5.5. Implementation results full ciphers using LUT: KHAZAD vs. BSPN-128. 
Used resources Utilization of Resources 
Method Resources 
KHAZAD BSPN KHAZAD BSPN 
8 
# slice flip flop 721 720 18% 18% 
LUT # 4 input LUT 3764 2952 98% 76% 
S-box # occupied slice 2117 1814 110% 94% 
#BRAM 0 0 0 0 
Total equivalent gate 
34,361 28,452 
count for design - -
It is worth noting that these results are generated from the combination of both key 
scheduling and data operation. Although key scheduling is not working as frequently as 
the data operation does, the hardware will always requires FPGA resources dedicated to 
key scheduling regardless of its level of use. 
2) Data Operation Implementation 
As we know, the key scheduling operation is a relatively independent process in the 
cipher and is not processed frequently. Hence, we consider another scenario for the 
cipher that only data encryption and decryption is included in the design. Since our 
design purpose is to apply the circuit to a reconfigurable WSN, the cooperation of 
hardware and software can be used: first, the MCU can generate the round keys by 
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software and store them in its memory for future use; then the MCU indicates to the 
hardware to directly load the round keys and release the memory for other use. 
data_in 
Fig. 5.17. Structure of loading round keys. 
round key 0 
64 bits 
round key 1 
64 bits 
round key 8 
64 bits 
The interface of the design is the same as that of the full cipher except that the round 
keys are loaded in the following nine clock cycles after the rising edge of input key_ flag. 
The circuit structure for the loading round keys is illustrated in Fig. 5.17. Nine 64-bit 
registers are used to store the encryption round keys for future use. 
Table 5.61mplementation results for only en/decryption: KHAZAD vs. BSPN-128. 
Used resources Utilization of Resources 
Method Resources 
KHAZAD BSPN KHAZAD BSPN 
#slice flip flop 644 645 16% 16% 
I # 4 input LUT 1784 I349 46% 35% 
BRAM # occupied slice I234 I020 64% 53% 
S-box #BRAM I I 8% 8% 
Total equivalent gate 83,366 80,890 - -
count for design 
# slice flip flop 520 52 I I3% I3% 
8 
# 4 input LUT 2,028 I,083 52% 28% 
BRAM 
#occupied slice I,381 857 7I% 44% 
S-box #BRAM 8 8 66% 66% 
Total equivalent gate 54I,993 537,05I 
count for design - -
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We implement these two ciphers using BRAM structures for S-box with two cases: the 
"I S-box" method and the "8 S-box" method. The implementation result is shown in 
Table 5.6, which shows a similar trend as that of the full cipher implementation. The total 
equivalent gate count for cipher KHAZAD is much larger than that of BSPN. Moreover, 
the equivalent gate count for designs using eight S-box circuits is much larger than using 
only the one S-box circuit. 
3) Only Linear Transformation 
We now further investigate the resource consumption of the component of the ciphers 
KHAZAD and BSPN. Although the details of the two ciphers are different, they have 
similar SPN structure with eight rounds of operation. The two ciphers can be 
implemented with the same interfaces, timing requirements and method. The linear 
transformation part of these two ciphers is the major difference because the other basic 
components of an SPN are almost the same: (I) BRAM makes the S-box using the same 
resources of FPGA and (2) the operation of add round keys uses the same amount of 
XOR logic. Hence, we focus on analyzing the circuit of linear transformation explicitly. 
Table 5.7. Synthesis result of linear transformation. 
Macro Statistics BSPN KHAZAD 
8-bit xor2 8 28 
8-bit xor8 I -
1-bit xor2 - 144 
8-bit xor6 - 8 
The synthesis result is generated by Xilinx ISE as shown in Table 5.7, where the 
macro statistics is provided by Xilinx library. From the result, we can see the amount of 
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XOR logic used by cipher KHAZAD is greatly larger than that of BSPN, which leads to 
the major difference of resource consumption between these two ciphers. 
5.5 Energy Consumption Analysis 
In this section, we will introduce the method of evaluating the design 's power and 
present the power estimation results. 
5.5.1 Power Estimation Using Power Analyzer 
FPGA power includes two parts: static power (or quiescent power) and dynamic 
power [I 08]. Static power is the intrinsic power of the device and cannot be changed. It 
exists once the chip is powered on, even if there is no activity in the device. It includes 
transistor leakage, power consumed internally, and power dissipated in external 
termination resistors. Dy namic power is caused by the switching activity of CMOS 
transistors. Dynamic power is only consumed when the state of transistors changes, 
which depends on the specific implementation of the design. A design can consume less 
power if it is implemented in an appropriate way. That is to say, we can develop the 
design's energy efficiency for the part of dynamic power. 
Xilinx Xpower is a tool providing the power estimation for a FPGA design. The power 
of a design can only be analyzed after the process of "place and route". Xpower 
calculates the power based on the switching activity ofthe transistors. Any component in 
FPGA with switching activity has a corresponding capacitance model used for the power 
calculation. There are two methods for power estimation using Xpower: (I) a rough 
estimation by setting an expected toggle rate; (2) a more accurate estimation by providing 
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detailed transistor switching activity. Here, we choose the second method to get a 
relatively accurate result for our designs. 
RTL code 
ModeiSim 
Xilinx ISE 
ModeiSim 
Xilinx ISE 
1+------i Xilinx Xpower 
Fig. 5.18. Power estimation flow by X power. 
The flow for the power estimation is show.n in Fig. 5.18, where value change dump 
file (VCD) is a file to record the signal state at different timeslots and can be obtained by 
simulation. The switching activity of the circuit can be recorded in VCD file when we 
simulate the gate-level netlist of the design. Another purpose of the simulation at gate 
level is to examine whether the register transfer level (RTL) code is successfully 
synthesized into gate level netlist. Finally, Xpower reads the VCD file and generates the 
power estimation report. It is worth noting that the accuracy of the power estimation 
depends on the accuracy of the switching data. The simulation cases should be as 
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extensive as possible so that the recorded file can include relativ~ly complete switching 
information. 
5.5.2 Power Estimation Result 
We simulate the gate-level netlist of designs and calculate the energy consumed by 
processing encryption or decryption of a block size (64 bits) of data. The energy 
calculation does not include the key scheduling process since it is not frequently operated. 
We investigate the energy efficiency of cipher KHAZAD and BSPN, as well as the 
effects of different structures and target devices. 
1) LUTvs. BRAM 
We do the power estimation on cipher BPSN-64 by different implementation methods. 
The estimation result is shown in Table 5.8, which is obtained by simulating the design 
with 50 MHz clock. From the table, we can see that: 
• Although the power of design using eight S-boxes is larger than that of using one 
S-box, the relation of energy cost is the reverse. This results because the operation 
time for one block size of data using the eight S-boxes method is much faster than 
using the "1 S-box" method. Therefore, the energy cost for the "8 S-box" method 
is Jess although the power is higher. 
• Under the condition of using the same number of S-boxes, the design using 
BRAM consumes Jess energy than the design using LUT. This can be explained 
from the fact that the BRAM is designed and optimized directly for memory 
function, while LUT is designed for general-purpose usage. 
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In this table, we also present the results using two different FPGA devices: xc3s200 
and xc2vp I 00. It is worth noting that, for the same design, energy consumption may vary 
for different devices. Compared to xc3s200, xc2vp 100 is a relatively high-end FPGA 
product, which offers larger space for more complicated designs. From the results, we 
can see that the energy cost of xc2vp 100 is much higher than that of xc3s200. This result 
is caused by many factors, such as the different working voltage and parameters of 
manufacturing technology. Here, we just use this example to show that choosing an 
appropriate device is an important factor when considering low energy cost hardware 
implementation. 
Table 5.8. Power estimation for BSPN-64. 
Device S-box Cycles Power (mW) Energy (nJ) (per block) 
8 LUT 10 66.35 E= 
66.35mw x 10cycle 
13.27 nJ = 50M 
I LUT 73 12.33 E= 
12.33mw x 73cycle 
18.00 nJ = 
xc3s200 5PM 
8BRAM 10 39.85 E= 
39.85mw x 10cycle 
- 7.97 nJ 50M -
1 BRAM 73 9.20 E= 
9.20mw x 73cycle 
= 13.43 nJ 50M 
8 LUT 10 401.16 E= 
401.16mw x 10cycle 
= 80.23 nJ 50M 
I LUT 73 68.58 E= 
68.58mw x 73cycle 
= 95.75 nJ 
xc2vpl00 50M 
8BRAM 10 210.52 E= 
210.52mw x 10cycle 
= 42.10 nJ 50M 
1 BRAM 73 46.08 E= 
46.08mw x 73cycle 
= 67.28 nJ 50M 
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2) KHAZAD vs. BSPN 
We simulate cipher KHAZAD and BSPN-128 with 40MHz clock and calculate their 
energy cost. The power estimation is based on the structure of BRAM since it is the most 
energy efficient method as we discussed before. In this part, we investigate two scenarios: 
( 1) the energy cost of full cipher hardware implementation and (2) the energy cost of 
hardware and software cooperation. 
Table 5.9. Power estimation of full hardware (data operation). 
Cipher S-box Cycles Power (mW) Energy (nJ) (per block) 
BSPN-128 10 38.72 E= 
38.72mw x 10cycle 
= 9.68 8 40M 
KHAZAD BRAM 10 48.67 48.67mw x 10cycle E= 
40M 
= 12.17 
BSPN-128 73 12.50 E= 
12.61mw x 73cycle 
22.81 = I 40M 
BRAM 17.01mw x 73cycle KHAZAD 73 17.01 E= = 31.04 40M 
Table 5.10. Power estimation of full hardware implementation (key scheduling). 
Cipher S-box Cycles Power (mW) Energy (nJ) (per block) 
BSPN-128 83 36.16 E= 
36.16mw x 83cycle 
75.03 8 = 40M 
KHAZAD BRAM IS 39.97 39.97mw x 15cycle E= = 14.99 40M 
BSPN-128 732 12.21 E= 
12.21mw x 732cycle 
223.44 = 1 40M 
BRAM 17.81mw x 83cycle KHAZAD 83 17.81 E= = 36.96 40M 
~- ·----------
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• Results of Full Cipher Hardware Implementation 
To make a fair comparison, the energy cost of key scheduling and data en/decryption 
are calculated separately. The energy estimation results are shown in Table 5.9 and Table 
5.1 0, respectively. 
From the tables we can see that, for en/decrypting one block of data, cipher KHAZAD 
consumes much more energy cost than BSPN. Also, for the same cipher, the 8 S-box 
BRAM structure is more energy efficient. BSPN with eight BRAM S-boxes can achieve 
the least energy consumption among these four implementations. However, for the round 
key scheduling, cipher BSPN costs much more energy than KHAZAD, which is because 
the key scheduling process in BSPN is more complicated than KHAZAD. Note that the 
key scheduling will only happen at the initial period of key setup and when there comes a 
new updated key. As the key is updated infrequently in WSNs, the data en/decryption 
process is the major factor for energy consumption. 
• Results of Cooperation of Hardware and Software Implementation 
The energy cost of hardware and software cooperation includes two major parts: (I) 
the energy cost of key scheduling by software and (2) the energy cost of data 
en/decryption by hardware. We implement cipher KHAZAD and BSPN-128 in assembly 
language on an 8-bit microprocessor Atmega 128 as other software implementations in 
Chapter 4. The energy results are shown in Table 5.11, which includes detailed energy 
cost of the ciphers: key scheduling, data en/decryption and linear transformation. The 
energy cost results of the hardware implementation with only the data en/decryption are 
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shown in Table 5.12. Compared to a full cipher implementation, the cipher with only data 
path can save at least 30% of the energy cost. 
Table 5. 11. Software implementation comparison of 128-bit key cipher. 
Cipher Process CPU (cycle) Energy Cost (nJ) (per block) 
Key schedule 9644 E= 
13.8mw x 9644cycle 
16635.9 = 8M 
BSPN-128 En/decryption 796 E= 
13.8mw x 796cycle 
1373.1 = 8M 
Linear Trans. 14 E= 
13.8mw x 14cycle 
24.15 = 8M 
Key schedule 7057 E= 
13.8mw x 7057cycle 
12173.3 = 8M 
KHAZAD En /decryption 2491 E= 
13.8mw x 2491cycle 
= 4296.975 8M 
Linear Trans. 264 E= 
13.8mw x 264cycle 
= 455.4 8M 
Table 5.12. Power estimation of only data path hardware implementation. 
Cipher S-box Cycle Power (mW) Energy (nJ) (per block) 
BSPN-128 10 20.46 E= 
20.46mw x 10cycle 
5.12 = 8 40M 
BRAM 38.39mw x 10cycle KHAZAD 10 38.39 E= = 9.60 40M 
BSPN-128 73 8.06 E= 
8.06mw x 73cycle 
= 14.71 I 40M 
BRAM 11.86mw x 73cycle KHAZAD 73 11.86 E= = 21.64 40M 
It is worth noting that, the energy cost above is the dynamic energy consumption and 
our analysis is based on a reconfigurable sensor node. Although the energy consumption 
of software implementation is much more than the hardware implementation, it does not 
mean an FPGA should be incorporated into a sensor node, which is not originally 
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designed as a reconfigurable sensor node. The reason is that an FPGA is not a power 
saving device, as it consumes much more static energy than an especially designed CPU 
ASIC. 
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Fig. 5.19. HW implementation vs. HW & SW cooperation (KHAZAD). 
The energy cost of cooperation is calculated by combining the software energy cost 
and hardware cost together, as shown in Fig. 5.19 and Fig. 5.20 for KHAZAD and 
BSPN-128, which are plotted based on only one key scheduling process at the beginning 
of key setup. We can see that cipher BSPN achieves better energy performance than 
KHAZAD under the same conditions. For both cipher KHAZAD and BSPN, the 
implementation using eight S-boxes achieves better energy performance than using one 
S-box. In addition, as the number of bytes of data increases, the cooperative method 
achieves better energy cost under the condition using the same number of S-boxes. The 
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implication is that for sufficiently large amounts of data encrypted between re-keying 
events, a cooperative approach is preferred over a pure hardware implementation and 
greatly preferred over a pure software implementation (given the data from Table 5.11). 
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Fig. 5.20. HW implementation vs. HW & SW cooperation (BSPN-128). 
5.6 Summary 
In this chapter, we have focused on hardware implementation of involutional block 
ciphers in reconfigurable WSNs. We first introduce the background of recon:figurable 
wireless sensor networks and its state of art. In a reconfigurable WSN, the cryptographic 
algorithm implemented by hardware can achieve higher flexibility and speed. We 
recommend using involutional block ciphers because both the encryption and decryption 
can share the same circuit. Two involutional block ciphers are chosen as candidates: 
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KHAZAD and BSPN (with 64-bit key size and 128-bit key size). We focus on design of 
energy efficient ciphers for the target device of FPGA, considering different design 
factors: the structure of the design, the resource utilization of FPGA and the 
implementation architecture sue h as the number of S-box circuits. By implementing 
cipher KHAZAD and BSPN with different methods, we further analyze the dynamic 
power of circuit and calculate the energy cost of the design. The power estimation is 
obtained by using Xpower, a power analysis tool provided by Xilinx. We compare the 
implementation of two scenarios: full cipher implemented by hardware and cipher 
implemented by cooperation of hardware and software. Results show that (I) cipher 
BSPN achieves better energy performance than KHAZAD with the major reason of the 
simplicity of linear transformation; (2) ciphers using BRAM to implement 8 parallel S-
boxes can achieve better energy performance, especially when software and hardware are 
working together. 
Chapter 6 
ENERGY COST IN CRYPTOGRAPHIC SCHEMES 
This chapter presents the energy cost analysis for different cryptographic schemes in a 
WSN. After investigating the energy cost of cryptographic algorithms in the previous 
chapters (software-oriented in Chapter 4 and hardware-oriented in Chapter 5), we 
investigate cryptographic schemes in this chapter, which directly affect the 
communication energy cost for a wireless sensor node. The energy limitation of a sensor 
device is a challenging constraint in WSNs. Researchers have focused on studying 
cryptographic algorithms that directly impact on the computational energy cost in a WSN, 
by evaluating existing cryptographic algorithms [35][85] or proposing new energy 
efficient ciphers [86][87]. However, these studies are mainly based on the algorithm itself, 
independent of the cryptographic scheme. There are proposals that focus on the 
cryptographic scheme, such as TinySec [63], SPINS [62] and other encryption schemes 
developed from TinySec [70][67][68][69]. Although these proposed schemes do 
recommend a mode of operation for block ciphers applied to WSNs, no effort has been 
made to investigate the energy efficiency of a sensor node in a noisy environment, 
considering both the cryptographic algorithm and the cryptographic scheme as a whole. 
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In this chapter, we explore the effect of packet size, the distribution of the 
initialization vector and the channel quality on the energy consumption of cryptographic 
communication schemes in WSNs. We present the integrated performance evaluation for 
different ciphers and schemes by developing an analysis model for a sensor node, which 
considers various factors, and the appropriateness of the model is supported by 
simulation results. The cryptographic schemes to be considered will all be based on block 
ciphers and software-oriented environment. In conclusion, we recommend using the 
lightweight block cipher BSPN with the cipher feedback scheme to encrypt the data 
thereby achieving energy efficiency without compromising the security. 
As we discussed before, in cryptographic communication schemes, encrypted data (or 
ciphertext) takes the place of the original payload (or plaintext) to achieve the data 
confidentiality. A message authentication code (MAC) functions as the cryptographic 
checksum, providing both data integrity and data authentication. We take a packet as 
correctly transmitted only when the recalculated MAC value equals the transmitted MAC 
value, and assume the difference is caused either by a noisy channel or by a malicious 
attacker. 
6.1 Factors Affecting the Communication Cost 
Before evaluating the energy cost of different cryptographic schemes, we first discuss 
several factors, which will affect the communication energy cost when cryptography is 
applied to a WSN. 
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6.1.1 Mode of Operation 
A mode of operation is a method to make use of a symmetric key block cipher when 
operating on a large bulk of data [61]. The mode determines how to use the block cipher 
to derive the ciphertext and has an impact the communication energy cost in WSNs. CBC 
mode is a common selection for encrypting large amounts of data and is proposed for use 
in the TinySec scheme on a per-packet basis [63]. In [63], to reduce the size of ciphertext 
to the same number of bits as plaintext, the ciphertext stealing technique [97] is used. 
However, the ciphertext size cannot be decreased below the block size when the amount 
of plaintext is less than the block size of the cipher. Counter mode and CFB mode make 
the encryption process similar to a stream cipher, which generates the same number of 
ciphertext bits as plaintext bits, and counter mode is proposed for use in WSNs by the 
SPINS scheme [62]. Selection of an appropriate mode of operation for the block cipher is 
critical: issues such as mode related security weaknesses, error propagation, and loss of 
data synchronization must be considered in the context of practical WSN applications. 
There are also many advanced modes of operation proposed in recent years, which 
integrate the MAC generation with encryption using a block cipher. This includes offset 
codebook (OCB) mode [65], counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) mode [27], and 
Galois/counter (GCM) mode [64]. Some researchers propose to use an advanced mode in 
WSNs since it can accelerate the speed of operation and save some of the computational 
energy cost of MAC generation. However, it is worth noting that in a WSN, the overall 
energy cost will not be significantly affected, as our analysis results will show later, since 
r-----------------------------~----- -----
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communication energy cost is the major factor affecting the energy consumption of 
encryption schemes applied to a sensor node. 
6.1.2 Initialization Vector 
The initialization vector (IV) plays an important role in cryptographic mechanisms, 
and although the content of the IV itself is not kept confidential, the use of a particular IV 
value should not be repeated. In CBC mode, the IV is used to produce the first block of 
ciphertext, so that the data can be randomized thereby effectively eliminating the 
repetition of data input to the cipher- an important security consideration [61]. In counter 
mode, the IV is used to initialize the counter value and, since this must be done 
periodically to ensure synchronization between the ends of the communication, it is also 
important in this case, that IV is not repeated. In CFB mode, the IV can be used to reset 
the feedback at the block cipher input. For security purposes, although the size of IV 
should ideally be similar to the block size of the cipher, to save the communication 
energy costs, some schemes reduce the size of IV. For instance, TinySec [63] reduces the 
effective IV size to 16 bits, which allows for the possibility of a repeated IV. Hence, there 
may be a potential weakness from a cryptographic point of view. 
In WSNs, IV greatly affects the energy performance of a scheme because of two 
factors: (1) when transmitted between nodes it consumes communication energy and (2) 
the ciphertext will not be decrypted correctly if the IV is not reliably known by both 
communicating parties. 
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6.1.3 Payload Size and Channel Quality 
To prevent malicious attacks, a packet will be discarded when the MAC verification 
fails. However, poor channel quality may also lead to an unsuccessful MAC verification. 
In addition, a packet with longer payload size will more likely lead to the packet being 
corrupted in a noisy channel. Hence, both the payload size of a packet and the quality of 
the communication channel will influence the amount of data that will be lost and 
consequently will affect the energy efficiency of a sensor node. 
6.2 Description of Cryptographic Schemes 
When a link layer cryptographic scheme is applied in a WSN, the IV is generated by 
the transmitter and must be known to both the communication sides. Hence, the 
origination and distribution of IV content are critical. In this section, we explore several 
typical methods that can be used to encrypt in WSNs and the associated IV distribution 
processes. Typically, IV distribution methods in WSNs have been classified into two 
types: (1) including IV in each packet being transmitted [63] and (2) transmitting IV in an 
independent packet periodically [62]. Here we also present another IV distribution 
method, which is based on previous ciphertext collection so that it does not require the 
designated IV information to be transmitted. We have selected several cryptographic 
schemes encompassing different modes of operation and IV distribution approaches, and 
analyze them in terms of their energy efficiency when applied to WSNs. First, we 
describe the schemes. 
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6.2.1 CBC Mode+ Implicit IV Scheme 
In this scheme, the IV is included in each packet and CBC mode is applied to a block 
cipher for encryption. We use implicit IV as the name to represent a general approach that 
transmits the IV in each packet so that the receiver can recover the IV directly from the 
received packet to use in the decryption. In this scheme, the IV size is the same as the 
block size of the cipher. The disadvantage of this scheme is that extra bits are transmitted, 
which increases the communication energy cost of each packet. The packet format is 
shown in Fig. 6.1. In the implicit IV scheme, the packet will be decrypted correctly when 
it is transmitted and received without error (i.e., the MAC verification passes). 
Nss Nha Niv Npla Nmoc_., 
START SYMBOL DEST I AM I LEN IV PAYLOAD MAC 
Fig. 6.1. Packet format of implicit IV scheme. 
6.2.2 TinySec Scheme 
TinySec [63] uses information in each packet to determine the IV and applies CBC 
mode to a block cipher for encryption. Although similar to the implicit IV approach, it 
minimizes transmitted bits by using some information for IV that is already available in 
the packet. The packet format is shown in Fig. 6.2, where SRC is the source address of 
the sender and CTR is a 16-bit counter. This scheme reduces the energy cost by 
minimizing the number of bits being transmitted. The IV is taken from the fields from 
DEST to CTR. Since the effective size of the IV is much less than the block size, it is 
conceivable that, in some contexts, IV will be repeated over a long duration of time. 
Nevertheless, it is argued that the semantic security ofthis scheme is sufficient [63]. The 
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energy cost is also minimized by applying CBC mode with ciphertext stealing technique 
[97] to encrypt the data. 
Nss Nha Nar Npia Nmac+ 
START SYMBOL DEST I AM I LEN SRC I CTR PAYLOAD MAC 
Fig. 6.2. Packet format of TinySec scheme. 
6.2.3 Counter Mode +Periodic IV without ACK Scheme 
The scheme uses counter mode of a block cipher for encryption, which requires a 
periodic transfer of IV to ensure that the encryption and decryption process remain 
synchronized. The SPINS scheme [62] proposes a similar approach, providing semantic 
security without transmission overhead. Without the periodic transfer of IV, a lost data 
packet will result in a permanent loss of cipher synchronization. For this purpose, IV can 
be communicated periodically within a special IV packet, separate from data packets. A 
newly received IV initializes the counter and subsequently the count increases by one for 
each block of data encrypted. 
In our study, it is assumed that a corrupted IV packet is simply discarded, resulting in 
corruption of the subsequent data packets until a new IV is successfully exchanged. The 
packet format is shown in Fig. 6.3, which includes both the IV packet and the data packet. 
This scheme reduces the energy cost of a packet over the schemes that include IV in each 
packet, but results in a high probability that the packet is not properly decrypted when the 
channel quality is poor. It can be explained that, first, subsequent packets cannot be 
decrypted correctly until the next IV packet is transmitted if the IV packet has been 
received with errors. In addition, even if the IV packet is received correctly, one data 
-------
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packet being discarded due to errors will affect the decryption of the following packets 
until the next IV packet is transmitted. 
(IV packet) 
14--- -Nu--~f------N rJ---~1--, 
START SYMBOL 
(Data packet) 
N,. 
START SYMBOL 
Fig. 6.3. Packet format of Periodic fV without ACK scheme. 
6.2.4 Counter Mode + Periodic IV with ACK Scheme 
This scheme is similar to the previous scheme except that a stop-and-wait ARQ 
protocol is used to guarantee the IV packet is being correctly received. Counter mode is 
also used in this scheme. Packet formats are shown in Fig. 6.4 for the IV packet, the 
acknowledgement (ACK) packet and the data packet. In the ACK packet, the "ACK" 
field represents the acknowledgement information. The energy cost will be higher than 
the periodic IV without ACK scheme, because two parts of energy are introduced by the 
ARQ scheme: first, reception of the ACK packet will consume communication energy; 
second, the IV packet may be retransmitted several times if the channel quality is 
particularly poor. It is worth noting that, although the IV packet is ensured to be correctly 
received, corrupted data packets will still be discarded resulting in a loss of 
synchronization in the decryption counter and, hence, the following data packets will not 
be decrypted correctly until the next IV distribution process. 
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(IV packet) 
Nss Nh N~v--•-Nma,-
START SYMBOL DEST I AM I LEN I IV MAC 
(ACK packet) 
Nss Nh Nack Nmac-
START SYMBOL DEST I AM I LEN ACK MAC 
(Normal packet) 
~--Nss Nh N1v 
START SYMBOL I DEST I AM I LEN I PAYLOAD MAC I 
Fig. 6.4. Packet format of periodic IV with ACK scheme. 
6.2.5 CFB Mode + Ciphertext Based IV Scheme 
We propose this cryptographic scheme based on using previously transmitted 
ciphertext as the IV for the next encryption. A block cipher can be configured for CFB 
mode, where the data in a packet is encrypted by XORing the plaintext block with the 
output of the block cipher, which has used the previous ciphertext block as input. We 
shall consider an approach that resets the feedback at the start of each packet by using the 
preceding ciphertext from the payloads of previous packets as an IV block to be fed to the 
block cipher input. Unlike other schemes, this scheme does not consume extra energy for 
either including IV bits in each packet or transmitting separate IV packets. The packet 
format is shown as Fig. 6.5. In this scheme, the current packet being decrypted depends 
on both the packet itself and the previous packets. Note the initial IV used to produce the 
first bits of ciphertext can be exchanged during the key establishment phase. 
Nss h N Nmac___. 
I START SYMBOL DEST I AM I LEN PAYLOAD MAC 
Fig. 6.5. Packet format of CFB scheme. 
- -------
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6.2.6 Other Schemes 
Other schemes combining cipher modes (e.g. CBC, counter, and CFB) with different 
methods of IV agreement are possible but are not investigated in our research. For 
example, it is possible to have a scheme, which uses counter mode with an IV sent in 
every packet to re-initialize the counter value for decryption. Another example would be 
the application of CBC with IV periodically resent with IV packets. Still another example 
is CFB mode, which does not synchronize to a block at the start of each packet. In this 
thesis, we have chosen several typical cryptographic schemes to investigate. 
6.3 Analysis of Cryptographic Schemes 
In this section, we first focus on constructing an analysis model based on the 
assumption of fixed size packets to evaluate the energy performance of the link layer 
cryptographic schemes for software-oriented application environments. Subsequently, the 
study will be extended to variable size packets under different probability distributions. 
In our analysis, we take binary symmetric channel (BSC) as the channel model to study 
the energy performance of different encryption schemes in the presence of noise. 
6.3.1 General Analysis for Fixed Size Packets 
1) Probability of the Error-free Packets 
The probability that a packet has one or more bit errors is decided by two factors: the 
probability of error for each bit (pe) and the size of the packet (Npkt). The probability that 
a received packet has no errors (P0 ) is expressed as 
(6.1) 
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where it is assumed that bit errors occur randomly and independently. The determination 
of Npkt is listed in Table 6.1 considering different cryptographic schemes. 
Table 6.1. Packet size for different schemes. 
Scheme Type Packet size 
CBC + Implicit IV Data Npkt = Nss + Nhd + Ntv + Nptd +Nmac 
Tiny Sec Data Npkt = Nss + Nhd + Nctr + Npld + Nmac 
Data Npkt = Nss + Nhd + Npld + Nmac 
Counter + Periodic IV without ACK 
IV Ntvpkt = Nss + Nhd + Ntv + Nmac 
Data Npkt = Nss + Nhd + Npld + Nmac 
Counter+ Periodic IV with ACK IV Ntvpkt = Nss + Nhd + Ntv + Nmac 
ACK Nackpkt = Nss + Nhd + Nack + Nmac 
CFB + Ciphertext based IV Data Npkt = Nss + Nhd + Npld + Nmac 
2) Energy Calculation 
The energy cost calculation has already been discussed in Chapter 3. The total energy 
cost of one packet depends on the type of the packet. For example, in the schemes with 
periodic IV, the IV packet and ACK packet energy cost does not include the encryption 
energy since the IV and ACK information is not encrypted. This is summarized in Table 
V. For the IV packet and ACK packet in the calculation of Etx and Erx• respectively, Npkt 
is replaced by Ntvpkt and Nackpkt• respectively, as shown in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2. Energy cost of different packet types. 
Packet Type Energy per packet 
Data packet Edata = Eenc + Etx + Emac 
IV packet Etv = Etx + Emac 
ACK packet Eack = Erx + Emac 
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3) Expected Number of Valid Data Bits 
As discussed in Chapter 3, we choose the energy efficiency, 11, as defined by the 
average number of data bits successfully transmitted per Joule by the sensor node as the 
metric to evaluate the performance of different schemes. This can be expressed as 
11 = n X Npld X P va (6.2) 
which depends on three factors : the number of the transmitted data packets, n , the 
payload size, Nptd, and the probability that the packet is correctly decrypted, Pvalid. 
Given parameters of the packet and sensor node energy of 1 Joule, the first two 
parameters can be calculated directly. In the following section, we will focus on the 
factor Pvalid• which varies for different schemes. 
6.3.2 Probability of Valid Packets for Different Schemes 
The probability that a packet is successfully received and decrypted ( Pvalid) strongly 
depends on the specific scheme applied. In determining an expression for Pvalid, we 
assume that the bit errors occur independently with a probability given by the bit error 
rate Pe· We consider now the probability for different schemes. 
1) CBC Mode+ Implicit IV Scheme 
In this scheme, since an IV is included in each data packet, the packet can be 
decrypted correctly when every bit of the packet is received correctly. Since CBC mode 
is used, Pvalid is given by P0 in (6.1) with 
N = rNptextl X b 
pld b ' (6.3) 
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where Npld and Nptext represent the number of payload bits and plaintext bits, 
respectively. This implies that the payload size is increased due to the application ofCBC 
mode. 
2) TinySec Scheme 
Since the TinySec scheme uses CBC mode of operation with the ciphertext stealing 
technique, Pvalid is given by P0 in (5) with 
if Nptext < b 
if Nptext 2:: b. (6.4) 
In this case, only when the amount of plaintext is less than one block, is the payload 
size increased due to application of the encryption. 
3) Counter Mode+ Periodic IV without ACK Scheme 
In this scheme, the probability that a data packet of size Npkt is correctly received is 
(6.5) 
where Npkt is the number of bits in the data packet and, for an IV packet of size Nivpkt• 
the probability that the packet is correctly received is 
(6.6) 
The probability that the data packet can be decrypted correctly is based on the probability 
that the previous IV packet and all previous data packets following the IV packet are 
successfully received and is given by 
(6.7) 
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where K represents the number of data packets sent for each IV packet and is assumed to 
be constant. We can see that Pvalid is determined by both K and the channel quality. If the 
channel is very noisy, there will be high energy cost because bit errors result in many 
data bits being discarded when MAC verification fails. 
4) Counter Mode + Periodic IV with ACK Scheme 
Since the acknowledgement ensures the receiver side knows the initial value of the IV, 
the probability of the data packet being correctly decrypted ( Pvalid) depends on the 
probability of data packet being transmitted correctly (Pdata) and the period of the IV 
packet (K). Similar to the periodic IV without ACK scheme, if one data packet is lost or 
transmitted with error, the counter value will Jose the synchronization and the following 
packets will not be decrypted correctly. The factor K affects how many of the following 
packets will lose synchronization. Based on receiving the IV packet correctly, the 
probability that the data packet can be decrypted correctly for this scheme is expressed by 
P P K+l p _ data- data 
valid - KX(1-Pdata) (6.8) 
Note that two parameters, Piv (probability of the IV packet transmitted correctly) and 
Pack (probability of the ACK packet transmitted correctly), directly impact the number of 
successfully transmitted data packets (n in (6.2)), although they do not occur in the 
expression for Pvalid· For each unit of energy, the less energy is consumed by the IV 
distribution process, the more energy can be provided to the data transmission. That is to 
say, with large value of Piv and Pack• more energy can be used to transmit data packets, 
which directly results in large value ofn and '1 in (6.2). On the contrary, if the channel is 
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very noisy, the IV packet and ACK packet are very likely to be corrupted and there will 
be much energy consumed during the process of the IV distribution. 
5) CFB Mode + Ciphertext Based IV Scheme 
For the CFB scheme, the probability of a data packet being decrypted correctly is 
given by 
where the parameter y is determined by 
if Nptd < b 
if Nptd ~ b 
(6.9) 
(6.1 0) 
and represents the number of previous packets whose ciphertext is used for the IV and 
therefore affects the decryption of the current packet. The value of y will be large for a 
small payload size, which will decrease the probability of the current packet being 
decrypted correctly. However, the small payload size will make the packet itself more 
likely to be transferred correctly, which counteracts the effect of the large y value. 
6.4 Analysis Results 
In this section, we present the results of the analysis model applied to the identified 
cryptographic schemes. 
6.4.1 Parameters 
The values of the parameters we have used in the analysis are listed in Table 6.3. We 
use the cipher AES, as it is the most applied block cipher today. However, similar results 
would result for other symmetric key ciphers. Physical parameters for the sensor device 
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are derived from the specifications of the commercial product Mica2 [82]. In addition, we 
use several bit error rate values to represent the different channel qualities. 
Table 6.3. Parameters used in the analysis. 
Object Parameter Value Unit 
C enc 3266 cycles 
Block cipher (AES) 
b I28 bits 
P cpu I3.8 mW 
fcpu 8 MHz 
f iX 27 rnA 
Sensor board 
f rx IO rnA 
u 3.3 v 
R 38400 bps 
N .. 8 bytes 
N hci 4 bytes 
N ;v 4 bytes 
Packet N ack I bytes 
N pld from I to 30 bytes 
N mac 4 bytes 
K IO packets 
Channel BER Sx I o·4, I 0-4, I o·5,0 -
6.4.2 Analysis Results for Different Schemes 
The analysis results of the five schemes present the energy efficiency for different 
payload sizes. In the analysis, we also present the results under different channel bit error 
rates. As expected, as BER increases, the energy efficiency decreases due to the necessity 
of discarding many corrupted packets. All cryptographic schemes have the same trend for 
the relationship between BER and energy efficiency. 
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Fig. 6.6. Analysis of Implicit IV scheme. 
1) CBC +Implicit IV Scheme 
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In Fig. 6.6, we can see that the curve for the implicit IV scheme shows a sawtooth 
shape, because CBC mode is used in this scheme and the size of encryption result is 
always an integer multiple of the block size. Here the size of IV is 128 bits, which is the 
same with the block size of AES. The extra bits being transmitted due to padding the 
plaintext data out to a multiple of a block size consume energy while providing no 
informational content to the communication. 
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2) TinySec Scheme 
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Fig. 6.7 shows the results for the specific fonnat of TinySec, which uses CBC (with 
ciphertext stealing) and includes the IV in each packet. As seen in the figure, the slope 
decreases as the payload size increases. This occurs because the ratio of the IV size to the 
packet size decreases. Since AES uses a 128-bit block size, for payload sizes of I to 16 
bytes, the plaintext is padded out to 128 bits and a full 128 bits of ciphertext will be 
produced resulting in a straight line for the corresponding portion of the graph. When the 
payload size is larger than the block size, the transmitted ciphertext size is the same as the 
plaintext size, since ciphertext stealing can be used. 
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3) Counter Mode + Periodic IV without ACK scheme 
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In Fig. 6.8, it can be seen that, for the periodic IV without ACK scheme applying 
counter mode, at high bit error rate, the energy efficiency decreases dramatically 
compared to lower bit error rate. This indicates that the periodic IV approach has a 
relatively poor performance in a poor channel condition. When the channel quality is not 
good, both the data packet and IV packet have a large probability of being discarded due 
to error, which will affect the decryption of the following data packets, which relies on 
synchronization of the counter value between transmitter and receiver. 
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4) Counter Mode + Periodic IV with ACK scheme 
As shown in Fig. 6.9, the trend of this scheme is similar to the periodic IV without 
ACK scheme. The acknowledgement does not improve the performance of the scheme 
very much. This is because when the channel quality is poor, the data packet also has a 
large probability of being corrupted, which will affect the following data packets until a 
new IV is established. 
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Fig. 6.9. Analysis of Periodic lV with ACK scheme. 
5) CFB Mode + Ciphertext based IV scheme 
30 
As shown in Fig. 6.1 0, that the CFB scheme achieves better energy efficiency for all 
the payload sizes compared to other schemes. We can also see that, compared to the 
period IV schemes, there is little spread in the curves when bit error rate increases. 
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6.4.3 Other Considerations 
1) Effect of Block Sizes 
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Consider the implicit IV scheme, which includes the IV in each packet. When CBC 
mode (without ciphertext stealing) is used on a block cipher, the block size of the cipher 
influences the energy efficiency. Since the block cipher processes data block by block, 
zeroes will be added to the end of the data if the payload size is not an integer multiple of 
the block size. For CBC mode, a cipher of larger block size tends to cause more energy 
inefficiency since extra communication energy cost is consumed to transmit the added 
dummy bits. Take a 7-byte payload for example: 72 bits of zeroes need to be added for a 
128-bit block cipher while only 8 bits are needed for a 64-bit block cipher. When the 
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payload size equals a multiple of the block size there is no extra communication energy 
cost introduced. When used in CBC mode, compared to cipher AES with a 128-bit block 
size, a 64-bit cipher such as BSPN causes fewer extra bits to be transmitted resulting in 
higher energy efficiency across the different payload sizes. For modes, such as counter 
mode and CFB mode, which do not result in extra bits of ciphertext to be transmitted to 
fill out blocks, the effect of different block sizes is very small, only being dependent on 
the efficiency ofthe block cipher. 
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Fig. 6.11. Analysis for different lV size conditions (BER=l 0-4). 
2) Effect of IV Sizes 
The size of IV directly impacts the energy cost when IV is included in the transmitted 
packet. As is exploited by the TinySec scheme, reducing the IV size can lead to a better 
energy performance. Fig. 6.11 shows the effects of different IV sizes for the condition of 
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BER equal 104 using the implicit IV scheme with CBC mode for AES. It can be seen that 
the energy efficiency increases when the IV size decreases. However, for security 
purposes, the IV size should be large enough to ensure that the IV is not repeated. 
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Fig. 6.12. Effects of period and payload size (AES, BER = 10'4). 
3) Effect of IV Period 
In the schemes that periodically transmit an IV packet to establish synchronization, the 
value of K, together with the size of the payload, impacts energy efficiency. One packet 
transmitted with an error will lead to the packet being discarded and, hence, the following 
packets cannot be decrypted correctly until the next IV packet comes. This encourages 
the value of K to be small. On the other hand, smaller K causes significant 
communication energy cost to transfer the IV packet, which will also decrease the energy 
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performance. It is desirable to find out that optimal value of K to balance these two 
factors. 
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The effect of period K and the payload size on the energy efficiency is shown in Fig. 
6.12, which is plotted for the periodic IV without ACK scheme. In this figure, the cipher 
AES is applied and BER is 10·4 • The size of IV is 128 bits, which is the same with the 
block size of AES. It can be seen that, as the payload size increases, the energy efficiency 
can obtain a maximum value with an optimal selection of period K. Consider the periodic 
IV without ACK scheme as an example to analyze the optimal K values. The energy 
efficiency can be expressed as 
(6.11) 
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where Edata and Eiv represents the energy cost for transmitting one data packet and IV 
packet, respectively. The optimal value of K for maximizing the value ofry can be derived 
by solving dTJ/dK = 0 for K. Fig. 6.13 illustrates the optimal period K according to 
payload sizes under different BER conditions. From this figure, we can see that the 
optimal period becomes shorter when the channel quality is poor. 
6.4.4 Simulation Results for Variable Size Packets 
To verify the suitability of the analysis models, we have performed extensive 
simulations for both fixed size packets and variable size packets. In our work, each 
scheme has been simulated using several types of probability distributions with different 
variances. The distributions considered are the binomial distribution, Poisson distribution, 
geometric distribution, and discrete uniform distribution. For example, in Fig. 6.14, Fig. 
6.15, Fig. 6.16, Fig. 6.17 and Fig. 6.18, each scheme is simulated using a binomial 
distribution with different variances (I, 3, and I 0). We can see that they are very similar 
to the results of the analysis model, which is based on fixed size payloads. Simulation 
results for other probability distributions also show that the resulting curves are very 
similar to the curves determined by the analysis model. This is illustrated in Fig. 6.19, 
where variable size packets with different distributions are used to simulate the CFB 
scheme and the results are presented along with fixed size analysis results. We conclude 
that the analysis model approximates well the energy cost behavior for sensor nodes for a 
large variety of packet size distributions. 
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6.5 Comparison of Cryptographic Schemes 
In this section, we compare the performance of the five different schemes. We use the 
analytical result to evaluate each scheme, because we have found through simulations 
that the analysis is representative of results for many packet distributions. We also 
calculate the improvement of the CFB scheme comparing to other schemes, which is 
obtained by 
improvement= TJA-TJB 
TJB 
(6.12) 
where TIA is the energy efficiency of CFB scheme and ry8 is the energy efficiency of the 
scheme we choose for comparison. 
6.5.1 Error-free Channels 
Fig. 6.20 compares the cryptographic schemes utilizing the cipher AES under the 
condition of an error-free channel. We can see that schemes of IV transmitted 
periodically (where we have used K = 1 0) achieve better results than the schemes of IV 
included in each packet. This is because periodic IV schemes can do the IV distribution 
without losing counter synchronization when the channel is error-free. In contrast, 
schemes transmitting the IV with every packet cost more energy than the periodic IV 
schemes. The CFB scheme also does not transmit IV within the packet and achieves a 
slightly better result than the periodic IV schemes. 
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The performance improvement of the CFB scheme compared to other schemes under 
the error-free channel is shown as Fig. 6.21. The CFB scheme achieves significant 
improvement over the other schemes. For example, for small payloads of less than 10 
bytes, the CFB scheme has an improvement of 40% or more over the TinySec scheme. In 
general, the exact value of improvement depends on the packet size with improvement 
being most notable for smaller payloads. 
6.5.2 Noisy Channels 
The results change significantly in a channel with noise, as shown in Fig. 6.22, which 
is based on BER of 10-4. The energy efficiency of periodical IV schemes (where we have 
Jet K= 1 0) dramatically decreases, because the successful decryption of the data packet 
depends on both the IV packet and previous data packets to be correctly received. In 
contrast, the TinySec scheme, which includes the IV information in every packet, 
achieves much better results. This can be explained by noting that, in the noisy channel, 
including an IV in each packet results in a larger probability to decrypt the packet 
correctly, because it only depends on the packet received to have no errors. The implicit 
IV scheme achieves the worst performance because the full size IV in each packet 
introduces too much communication energy cost. The CFB scheme still achieves the best 
performance result among all these schemes, as it reduces the extra communication 
energy cost of an IV in each packet with the small expense of introducing a modest 
decrease in the probability of a successfully decrypted packet. 
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Fig. 6.23 shows the performance improvement under the noisy channel with BER 
equal to 10·4• The comparison result illustrates that the CFB scheme achieves 
significantly better performance than all other schemes even when the channel is noisy. 
Typically, improvements are most significant for smaller size payloads. 
6.5.3 Considering Cryptographic Algorithm 
To consider the effect of the cryptographic algorithm on the overall energy efficiency, 
we have applied different ciphers to the CFB scheme and periodic IV without ACK 
scheme with K=lO. We also plot a curve for the case of no computational energy cost of 
MAC included in the scheme, which represents a lower bound for the energy cost of 
advanced mode of operation. The results are shown in Fig. 6.24. We can see that both the 
cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic scheme affect the final result. When the 
energy cost of the algorithm is relatively small, it will not affect the performance as much 
as the scheme. For example, there is a small difference between AES and BSPN when 
using the same cryptographic scheme. In the figure, we can also see that the effect of 
computational energy cost for MAC is also small, with slight difference shown for the 
CFB scheme using AES whether the computational energy cost of MAC is included or 
not. 
As a broadly accepted secure cipher, AES is a good choice for WSNs. However, our 
analysis is based on a model with one-way nature ofthe communication: the sensor node 
exclusively encrypts and transmits data packets. It is worth noting that the decryption of 
AES is much less efficient than its encryption. Our implementation result shows that, 
compared to the 3266 cycles needed to encrypt a plaintext block, 49864 cycles are 
CHAPTER 6. ENERGY COST IN CRYPTOGRAPHIC SCHEMES 160 
needed to decrypt a ciphertext block. In some scenarios, a sensor node may need both the 
functionality of encryption and decryption and the large number of cycles for decryption 
may dramatically decrease the energy performance of the sensor node. For example, if 
data is transmitted to a sensor node encrypted using AES in CBC mode, then the sensor 
node must use the AES decryption operation to decrypt the data. If communication in a 
WSN is bidirectional resulting in a significant amount of decryption, AES should either 
not be used or used in a mode such as counter or CFB that only requires the encryption 
functionality. 
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6.6 Summary 
In this chapter, we have investigated the performance of secure data transmission at 
the link layer in wireless sensor networks, considering specifically the cryptographic 
schemes. The energy efficiency will be directly affected by many factors, such as the 
algorithm utilized, the mode of operation, the IV distribution, the packet size and the bit 
error rate of the channel. We have proposed using the amount of valid data transferred 
per Joule from the sensor node as the metric to evaluate the energy efficiency when 
cryptographic schemes are applied to communication between sensor nodes. We have 
compared the energy efficiency among several typical cryptographic schemes by 
developing an analysis model. Our results suggest that a cryptographic scheme using a 
symmetric key block cipher, such as AES, in cipher feedback mode achieves better 
performance for a wide range of channel qualities and provides significant improvement 
in energy efficiency compared to other schemes for small payload sizes. 
Chapter 7 
ENERGY COST IN KEY ESTABLISHMENT 
This chapter presents the energy cost analysis for session key establishment in a WSN. 
The session key establishment is a relatively independent process compared to the secure 
data transmission, which is investigated in previous chapters. A session key is used to 
encrypt the data b-etween two nodes, and it should be established before the starting of 
their secure data communication. In a WSN, the session key establishment is an 
important process in constructing a secure data communication. A successful session key 
establishment is a prerequisite for the subsequent secure data communication; otherwise, 
the encrypted data can be easily eavesdropped and altered if the key is leaked out. 
In this chapter, we examine the energy cost of session key establishment in a WSN 
using the model developed from the previous chapter. We explore the effects of a key 
establishment to the overall energy cost in a sensor node, especially considering the 
frequency of key establishment and the quality of communication channel. 
·---------------------------------
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7.1 Characteristics of Session Key 
The cryptographic algorithm determines the nature of a key. For a cryptosystem using 
a symmetric key cipher, both communicating parties need the same cipher key for 
encrypting and decrypting data; while for a cryptosystem using an asymmetric key cipher, 
such as RSA, a pair of keys, the public key and the private key, are used. Since, in WSNs, 
an asymmetric key cipher consumes too much energy, symmetric key ciphers are 
typically being used for link layer encryption. The objective of session key establishment 
is to make both communicating sides agree with a cipher key, and the key should be 
protected from being accessed by others. 
In a WSN, a unique cipher key, called the initial key, is typically embedded in the 
sensor node device before deployment. This cipher key is unique and supposed to be only 
known by the base station. After nodes are deployed, a shared key is established through 
a secure method when two nodes want to communicate each other securely. The secure 
method is typically performed between the base station and the pair of the nodes utilizing 
the unique initial key. 
It is obvious that the data communication becomes more secure if a sensor node 
frequently updates its session key shared with other nodes. The more frequently a sensor 
node changes its key, the less ciphertext can be collected by an attacker for the 
cryptanalysis. However, the sensor node is an energy-limited dev ice and the energy 
consumed in a session key establishment cannot be ignored. 
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7.2 Session Key Establishment 
In this chapter, we consider a typical scenario of the session key establishment in a 
WSN. A cluster based topology is often applied in WSNs to achieve the energy 
efficiency, with certain nodes (usually called cluster head or aggregator) managing the 
sensor nodes within one hop. By doing this, the sensor nodes only deal with relatively 
simple task such that the energy cost is saved. It is illustrated in Fig. 7.1 that a typical 
sensor network includes three types of nodes: common sensor nodes, aggregators and a 
base station. In this figure, the common sensor nodes sense data (such as temperature, 
smoke, humidity, etc.) and send it to an aggregator. The aggregator is regarded as the 
cluster head and is assumed to have much more energy supply. After aggregating, data is 
sent to the base station, which has a continuous energy supply. The base station is a trust 
centre and in charge of generating and assigning all the session keys. Each aggregator 
and sensor node has a unique ID and unique initial key, which is only known by the base 
station. 
Fig. 7.1. A typical scenario for WSNs. 
@ Sensor node 
@ Aggregator 
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Table 7.1. Description of the symbol in the packet format. 
Symbol Size (bits) Description 
IDA 8 The ID of the aggregator 
IDN 8 The ID ofthe node 
Ksess k_size The session key, determined by the block cipher 
Nt. Nz, N3 b (block size) The nonce 
We consider Needham-Schroeder [8], a typical session key establishment protocol, 
between a sensor node (N) and an aggregator (A). The Needham-Schroeder protocol is 
based exclusively on the use of syJ!lmetric key ciphers. As shown in Fig. 7.2, there are six 
steps included in the key establishment. In this figure, we use Ex(X) to represent 
encryption of the content X by key K, and the meaning of other symbols is listed in Table 
7.1. The specifics of session key establishment are explained as following: 
/ 
// .. / ,../ p2 : IDA, ION, Nt, N2, MAC 
// P3 : EkA(Ksess./DA, ION, N2, EkN(Ksess. IDA, Nt)), MAC 
// ...... 
( _./ Pt : ION, Nt 
: ~" --------------
6< c" ~~:::: ~: ~~j~:::::: !~:: ~:~ ': ~ 
··.. Ps : Eksess(N3) / 
··············..... . ... ·············· 
Fig. 7.2. Session key establishment process. 
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Step 1: The sensor node sends out packet P1, including the node's IDN and a random 
nonce N~. to the aggregator asking for establishment of a session key. 
Step 2: When the aggregator receives packet P1, it sends a packet P2 to the base station 
asking for a session key, which is to be only known by the aggregator and the sensor 
node. This packet includes ( 1) IDs of the aggregator and the sensor node (IDA and IDN), 
(2) nonces which are received from the sensor node (N1) and generated by the aggregator 
(N2), and (3) a MAC value generated by CBC mode using the initial key KA of the 
aggregator. Since KA is only known by the base station and the aggregator, the MAC 
value is used to ensure the data integrity and authentication. 
Step 3: When the base station receives P2 and verifies the MAC, it assigns a session key 
Ksess for the aggregator with IDA and the sensor node with IDN. The session key is 
transmitted within packet P3, with other information of both the applicants. It is worth 
noting that the session key appears twice in this packet, one is for the aggregator, and the 
other is for the sensor node, which is encrypted by KN, the initial key of sensor node. The 
whole packet is encrypted using the initial key KA, which is also used for generating the 
MAC. Only the aggregator with IDA can decrypt this packet and read the session key Ksess· 
However, the aggregator cannot decrypt the information for the sensor node, since KN is 
only known by the base station and the sensor node. 
Step 4: After decrypting the packet P3, the aggregator obtains the details of this packet: 
(1) the ID indicates which sensor node shares the key with the aggregator, (2) the nonce 
ensures the information is not replayed, and (3) the information of the session key for the 
sensor node is sent to the sensor node within P4. The sensor node decrypts the packet P4 
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using key KN. The nonce N 1 is very important information in this packet, since it prevents 
the replaying attack and ensures the integrity of this packet at the same time. The sensor 
node will compare the decrypted value for N1 and the value it generated originally. If 
these two values are the same, Ksess will be accepted as the session key shared with the 
aggregator. 
Step 5: The sensor node generates another nonce N3, and encrypts it using the accepted 
session key Ksess· This information is transmitted to the aggregator within the packet P 5• 
Step 6: The aggregator receives P5, and obtains the nonce N3 by decrypting it using their 
session key Ksess· Then the aggregator encrypts the data with value N 3+ I using the session 
key Ksess and sends it to the sensor node within the packet P6. 
The whole process protects the session key from being revealed by others. The first 
three steps focus on generating the session key and the following steps focus on 
exchanging and authenticating the key. During these steps, a session key can be safely 
established between the aggregator and the sensor node assuming the base station can be 
trusted. Meanwhile, the key cannot be known or even altered by others since the session 
key is well protected by the initial keys, which are only known by the base station. It can 
also avoid the replaying attack due to the utilization of the randomly generated nonce. 
7.3 Simulation of the Session Key Establishment 
We perform simulation to evaluate the energy cost of session key establishment in a 
WSN using the model developed in Chapter 6. 
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START SYMBOL DEST I AM I LEN IDA I ION I N, I N2 MAC 
N, h Nplo Nmoc-. 
START SYMBOL DEST I AM I LEN EkA(K••••• IDA, ION, N2, Eks(Kaoss, IDA, N,)) MAC 
N, Nh Np/o . 
START SYMBOL DEST I AM I LEN EkN(K ..... IDA, N,) 
N,, Nh Np~~ 
START SYMBOL DEST I AM I LEN Eksess(N3) 
- N, "h N""' _.. 
Ps START SYMBOL DEST I AM I LEN Eksoss(N3+1) 
Fig. 7.3. Packet formats for the session key establishment. 
Table 7.2. Payload size of different packet. 
Packet ID Payload size 
pl Nptd = 8 + b 
p2 Nptd = 8 + 8 + b + b = 16 + 2b 
p3 Nptd = f(b + 8 + 8 + k_size + f(b + 8 + k_size)/bl x b)/bl x b 
p4 Nptd = f(b + 8 + k_size)/bl x b 
Ps Nptd = b 
p6 Nptd = b 
7.3.1 Packet Format 
The packet formats used in the simulation are shown in Fig. 7.3. There are seven types 
of packets in the session key establishment as explained in the previous section. The 
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payload size of each packet is calculated and the result is shown in Table 7.2. However, 
our research mainly focuses on evaluating the energy cost of a sensor node in the session 
key establishment. Hence, only packets transmitted or received by a sensor node are 
considered, which include Pt. P4, Ps and P6. 
7.3.2 Simulation Description 
During the session key establishment period, both encryption and decryption are 
involved. Unlike the secure data transmission, key scheduling is processed during the 
session key establishment. Our research focuses on the traditional sensor node and the 
cryptographic algorithms are implemented for software. Two block ciphers are chosen as 
candidates: (1) the widely used block cipher AES and (2) the involutional cipher BSPN 
(with 64-bit and 128-bit key size). The number of CPU operation cycles for these block 
ciphers is listed in Table 7.3, including the key scheduling, encryption and decryption. 
Notice that for cipher BSPN, the number of operation cycles for the encryption and 
decryption is the same due to their involutional characteristics. The simulation is 
performed by Matlab. In this simulation, the random packets are generated with 
independent probability of bit errors and the packet will be discarded when errors being 
detected. As a result, the key establishment is failed and the session key needs to be 
reestablished until both communicating sides know the key. The energy cost is counted 
including both the communication cost and computational cost. Parameters used in the 
simulation are the same as in previous chapters. 
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Table 7.3. Operation cycles for block ciphers. 
Cipher Key scheduling Encryption Decryption 
AES 841 3266 49864 
BSPN 64 6256 796 796 
BSPN 128 9644 796 796 
7.4 Simulation Results 
Now we focus on studying two effects of the session key establishment: different 
cryptographic algorithms used in a sensor node and various frequency of the session key 
updates. Both these effects are studied with the consideration of the channel quality. 
Table 7.4 Key distribution energy cost (BER = 0). 
# Key distribution events AES BSPN-64 BSPN-128 
01 0.0222 0.0129 0.0137 
02 0.0423 0.0247 0.0261 
03 0.0625 0.0364 0.0385 
04 0.0826 0.0482 0.0509 
05 0.1028 0.0599 0.0633 
06 0.1230 0.0716 0.0757 
07 0.1431 0.0834 0.0881 
08 0.1633 0.0951 0.1005 
09 0.1834 0.1069 0.1129 
10 0.2036 0.1186 0.1254 
7.4.1 Effects of Cryptographic Algorithm 
We compare the energy cost of session key establishment for different block ciphers 
assuming error free channel. Table 7.4 shows the energy cost in an error-free channel. In 
this table, we can see that for the same number of key establishment times, the energy 
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cost using AES is much higher than the other two ciphers. The reason is that the 
decryption of cipher AES needs a large number of CPU cycles, and hence, consumes 
much more energy than other ciphers. BSPN-128 consumes more energy cost than 
BSPN-64 mainly due to the 128-bit key size, requiring a larger communication energy 
cost (i.e., k_size is larger in the packets of Table 7.2). 
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Fig. 7.4. Key distribution energy cost (BER = 10'4). 
Simulation results under the condition of a noisy channel with BER of I 0-4 are shown 
in Fig. 7.4. Compared with the error-free channel, more energy is consumed since the 
transmission errors may lead to retransmission of the packet during the session key 
establishment. In this figure, we can see that the trend of energy cost by different ciphers 
is the same as that of error-free channel. Still, AES and BSPN-64 are the least and most 
energy efficient ciphers for the session key establishment, respectively. 
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7.4.2 Effects of the Key Update Frequency 
There is a tradeoff between the session key establishment and the secure data 
communication. On one hand, updating the key frequently can make the data 
communication more secure since the attacker is constrained by the amount of ciphertext 
collected under one key; on the other hand, session key establishment consumes energy, 
which is a serious concern for a WSN. We now investigate the effect of the key update 
frequency to the energy efficiency of a sensor node's secure communication. 
Simulation results are shown in Fig. 7.5 and Fig. 7.6, with different key update 
frequencies in an error-free channel and noisy channel, respectively. We let T represent 
the lifetime of a session key (i.e., the number of data packets sent between key 
establishment processes). For example, "T = I" represents that a session key 
establishment happens for every data packet transmitted and "T= unlimited" means there 
is only one session key establishment at the start of a node's life span. In this simulation, 
we use the block cipher AES and the CFB scheme, which is discussed in previous 
chapters. From the figure, we can see that (1) both the error-free channel and noisy 
channel have similar results with energy efficiency decreasing when the channel quality 
becomes worse and (2) the energy efficiency increases when the payload size increases. 
We can also see that the energy efficiency is greatly affected when the session key is 
changed frequently. However, with the lifetime of a session key increased, the effect 
becomes less. Notice that the case "T= 1" is an extreme case for session key establishment, 
since every packet is encrypted with a different key. However, it is not practical since it 
sacrifices too much energy, which can be otherwise used to transmit data. 
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Fig. 7.7 shows the detailed frequency effects. We can see that, when the frequency is 
low enough, about more than I 00 packets per session key, the energy efficiency is 
relatively constant. For T<20, energy efficiency is greatly reduced. Fig. 7.8 shows the 
data communication with session key establishment using different block ciphers. This 
simulation is under the condition of BER= I 0-4 and assumes the life of the session key is 
I 0 packets. From the figure, we can see that for frequent session key distributions, the 
choice of block ciphers will affect the energy efficiency. In this figure, the energy 
efficiency for using AES is much lower than using BSPN, which is because AES needs 
much more CPU cycles to perform the decryption process. The BSPN-64 achieves better 
energy efficiency than BSPN-128 mainly due to the size the key, i.e. , much 
communication energy is consumed to transmit the session key. 
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In this chapter, we have focused on investigating the session key establishment in 
wireless sensor networks. Session key establishment plays an important role in the secure 
data communication, since both communicating parties need to agree on a key before 
encrypting a message. In a WSN, the session key has to be established between two 
nodes through an open broadcast media. We have investigated a typical session key 
establishment scenario in a cluster based WSN. We focus on the energy cost of the key 
establishment including both the computational cost and communication cost. In 
particular, we explore the effects brought by the channel quality and the key 
establishment frequency. Simulations are performed using the model we developed in the 
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previous chapter and simulation results show that the energy efficiency of a sensor node 
will not be greatly affected unless the session key is updated very frequently. As a 
tradeoff between the security and performance, we recommend extending the life time of 
a session key long enough so that it will only slightly impact the total number of valid 
data bits transmitted for a sensor node. 
Chapter 8 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
8.1 Conclusions 
This thesis investigates the energy performance of link layer secure communication in 
wireless sensor networks (WSNs), considering both the cryptographic algorithms and 
cryptographic schemes. Energy limitation is one of the largest problems in WSNs. 
Therefore, it is crucial to choose appropriate cryptographic algorithms and schemes for a 
sensor node, so that the suitable security can be achieved and energy consumption is kept 
to a minimum. In a sensor node, the energy cost introduced by cryptography includes 
computational cost and communication cost. The former is mainly affected by 
cryptographic algorithms, while the latter is affected by cryptographic schemes being 
used, that is, the method of using an algorithm to achieve the security goal. To extend the 
life span of a sensor node as long as possible, both types of energy cost need to be 
minimized. 
There are many types of sensor nodes produced for different purposes. However, from 
the implementation point of view, they can be categorized into software-oriented and 
hardware-oriented. A software-oriented sensor node is the classical type, which uses a 
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microprocessor to execute all kinds of tasks. In contrast, a hardware-oriented sensor node 
is a new type, which combines reconfigurable hardware (typically FPGA) and a 
microprocessor together to provide higher performance. To evaluate the energy cost of 
cryptographic algorithms in sensor nodes, we have implemented several cryptographic 
algorithms for both these two implementation environments. 
For software implemented cryptographic algorithms, we have chosen different types 
of symmetric ciphers to evaluate, including both block ciphers and stream ciphers. We 
estimated the energy consumption of the microprocessor by calculating the number of 
CPU cycles being used. We especially investigated different factors affecting the energy 
cost of cryptographic algorithms, including the intrinsic factor of algorithm 
characteristics and extrinsic factors of channel quality. 
For hardware implemented cryptographic algorithms, we especially choose 
involutional block ciphers as the characteristic of involution allows using the same circuit 
for both encryption and decryption, which minimize resources required for a sensor node. 
We have focused on studying the method of energy-efficient design based on an FPGA 
and further investigated the energy c ost advantage of software-hardware cooperation 
based on a software implemented key scheduling process and hardware implemented 
encryption. 
To evaluate the energy efficiency when cryptographic schemes are applied to the 
sensor node communication, we have proposed using energy efficiency defined as the 
amount of valid data transferred per Joule from the sensor node as the metric since the 
limited energy supply is an important constraint in WSNs. The energy efficiency for a 
---- - - ----------------------------
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sensor node can be directly affected by many factors, such as the algorithm utilized, the 
mode of operation, the packet size, the IV distribution, and the bit error rate of the 
channel. We explored the energy cost of secure data transmission in WSNs by developing 
an analysis model to compare the energy efficiency among several typical cryptographic 
schemes, and showing the model 's appropriateness by simulations. In addition, we have 
investigated the energy cost of session key establishment in a WSN, which is an 
important part of secure data transmission. We have also studied different effects for key 
establishment in WSNs, such as the cryptographic algorithm used and the key update 
frequency. 
We have investigated the performance of secure data transmission at the link layer in 
wireless sensor networks, considering both the cryptographic algorithms and 
cryptographic schemes. Results suggest that a cryptographic scheme using a lightweight 
symmetric key block cipher, BSPN, with a cipher feedback scheme achieves better 
performance for a range of channel qualities and for small payload sizes provides a large 
relative improvement in the energy efficiency compared to other schemes. In addition, as 
simulation results show that key establishment only takes a small proportion of the total 
energy cost in a sensor node, the security of data communication can be further 
strengthened by occasionally updating the encryption key based on a symmetric key 
distribution process. 
8.2 Future Work 
The future work may include several directions: 
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• In our research, we have implemented the involutional ciphers BSPN and 
KHAZAD targeting for FPGA. However, the FPGA is not especially designed 
as a low power device. To save the energy cost, ASIC can be a better choice 
when large amount of sensor devices are needed. 
• Pipeline is an efficient approach for hardware implementation, which can 
greatly improve the efficiency and throughput when there is large amount of 
data needs to be operated. In our research, we did not use pipeline method 
since we focus on sensor device limited by energy cost. However, it will be a 
good direction in some special application environments, such as wireless 
multimedia sensor networks, which require transmitting large amount of 
multimedia data. 
• We have studied the energy efficiency of cryptographic schemes based on the 
software-oriented sensor node. Further investigation may include the energy 
efficiency of cryptographic algorithm for hardware-oriented sensor devices. 
• Compared to symmetric key cryptography, asymmetric key cryptography has 
an advantageous characteristic for broadcast authentication in a WSN. Hence, 
the future work may include analyzing the energy cost asymmetric key 
cryptography applied to WSNs and designing an appropriate key distribution 
scheme for WSNs. 
• Our research is focused on building the analysis model and performing 
theoretical evaluation. It is worth building a prototype for secure wireless 
sensor networks and obtaining the practical value of energy cost by emulation. 
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Appendix A: S-box 
Table A.l the KHAZAD Involutional S-box 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B c D E F 
0 BAS 4 2F 74 53 D3 D2 4DS 0 AC 8D BF 70 52 9A 4C 
1 EA DS 97 Dl 33 51 58 A6 DE 48 AS 99 DB 32 87 FC 
2 E3 9E 91 98 E2 BB 41 6E AS CB 68 95 Al F3 81 02 
3 cc C4 1D 14 C3 63 DA SD SF DC 7DC D 7F SA 6C sc 
4 F7 26 FF ED E8 9D 6F BE 19 AO FO 89 OF 07 AF FB 
5 08 15 OD 04 01 64 DF 76 79 DD 3D 16 3F 37 6D 38 
6 89 73 E9 35 55 71 78 8C 72 88 F6 2A 3E SE 27 46 
7 oc 65 68 61 03 Cl 57 D6 D9 58 DB 66 D73 A C8 3C 
8 FA 96 A7 98 EC 88 C7 AE 69 48 AB A9 67 OA 47 F2 
9 85 22 ES EE BE 28 81 12 83 18 OE 23 FS 45 21 CE 
A 49 2C F9 E6 86 28 17 82 lA 88 FE SA 09 C9 87 4E 
B El 2E E4 EO EB 90 A4 lE 85 60 00 25 F4 Fl 94 08 
c E7 75 EF 34 31 D4 DO 86 7E AD FD 29 30 38 9F F8 
D C6 13 06 OS cs 11 77 7C 7A 78 36 lC 39 59 18 56 
E 83 802 4 20 82 92 A3 co 44 62 10 84 84 43 93 C2 
F 4A BD SF 2D BC 9C 6A 40 CF A2 80 4F lF CA AA 42 
Table A.2 the BSPN Involutional S-box 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B c D E F 
0 00 41 ES F6 AO AD 78 DD 73 80[ 6 97 4F C7 DC 38 
1 4C 84 AA A2 99 D7 4E SF A7 CF Fl cc EB BF EE 81 
2 94 91 SA 62 55 38 88 C9 3E E2 DB EA 63 44 SD 85 
3 D3 AC FC 6C FB 39 66 A9 OF 35 DF 25 77 DO 28 E6 
4 AS 01 C8 BD 2D 89 BE 69 58 78 SA EC 10 DA 16 oc 
5 ED D2 E7 CA BS 24 87 D9 48 C1 22 70 AE 2E 83 17 
6 E9 76 23 2C 88 A6 36 DS 72 47 6E DB 33 CD 6A C4 
7 58 87 68 08 EF 95 61 3C 49 BE 8C 06 7F FA 81 7C 
8 82 7E 80 SE 96 2F SF 56 64 45 4A 26 7A FD 46 86 
9 DE 21 93 92 20 75 84 OBB c 14 9F 86 F9 AF A1 9A 
A 04 9E 13 C3 FO 88 65 18 40 37 12 83 31 OS sc 9D 
B 09 lF EO AB 11 54 98 71 AS FS CE C2 98 43 79 lD 
c F4 59 BB A3 6F D4 E4 OD 42 27 53 F3 186 D BA 19 
D 3D F8 51 30 cs 67 OA 15 6B 57 4D 2A OE 07 90 3A 
E 82 F2 29 FF C6 02 3F 52 F7 60 28 lC 48 50 lE 74 
F A4 1A El CB co 89 03 E8 Dl 9C 7D 34 32 8D FE E3 
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Fig. B. I. Flow chart of Implicit IV scheme and TinySec scheme. 
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Fig.B.4. Flowchart ofCFB scheme. 
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Fig. B.S. Flowchart of key distribution. 
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